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SYNOPSIS 
Creative accounting refers to the various practices management use to manipulate financial 
statements to ensure that the users of these financial statements draw the desired conclusions. The 
literature reveals that creative accounting is practised in various fonns in a number of countries, 
including South Africa. 
Headline earnings per share (HEPS) is an earnings measure that was developed to measure a 
company's trading perfonnance and is a mandatory reporting requirement for companies listed on 
the JSE Securities Exchange South Africa (JSE). Companies may be motivated to manipulate this 
figure as a result of the emphasis placed on it by the financial press, investment analysts and other 
users of financial statements. Instances of manipulation have been noted by the GAAP Monitoring 
Panel in South Africa. Therefore, this study examines the extent to which creative accounting 
practices are employed by companies in reporting HEPS. 
A sample of JSE-listed companies was selected and their HEPS figures analysed in order to achieve 
this objective. In total, the sample consisted of 173 companies. This sample included 89 of the 
largest JSE-listed companies and 84 of the smallest JSE-listed companies. These companies' 
annual financial statements for the financial year ending in the 2004 calendar year were obtained 
and analysed to identify HEPS manipulations. A HEPS manipulation was defined as a 
contravention of the requirements of Circular 7/2002 Headline Earnings (Circular 7/2002), which 
governs the reporting ofHEPS in South Africa. Data relating to each company's characteristics was 
also obtained from various sources in order to identify factors influencing HEPS manipulation. 
It was found that 47% of the sample manipulated HEPS. Approximately one-third of these 
manipulations were in a downwards direction and the remaining two-thirds were in an upwards 
direction. The descriptive statistics therefore provide evidence of HEPS manipulation by the 
sample companies. However, the statistical testing to extend this evidence to the population of JSE-
listed companies was inconclusive. 
The fonns ofHEPS manipulation employed by companies were also analysed. Overall, 38% of 
HEPS manipulators failed to adjust for items required to be adjusted for in tenns of Circular 7/2002. 
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41% ofHEPS manipulators adjusted for invalid items in terms of the circular and the remaining 
21 % of HEPS manipulators used a combination of these techniques. The most frequently 
unadjusted items were the release of a foreign currency translation reserve to the income statement 
upon the disposal of a foreign entity and the profit or loss on the disposal of property, plant and 
equipment. The most frequently identified invalid adjustments related to financial instruments and 
the amortisation of intangible assets. 
HEPS manipulations were then analysed across broad industry classifications. Although statistical 
testing proved inconclusive, evidence of varying levels ofHEPS manipulation between different 
industries was detected. The general industrials industry classification was identified as exhibiting 
the greatest extent and magnitude of HEPS manipulation. 
Lastly, multiple regression analysis was used to identify factors associated with a company's 
propensity to engage in HEPS manipulation. It was hypothesised that the following factors would 
be associated with HEPS manipulation: 
• Share price fluctuations 
• Earnings growth 
• Debt structure 
• Company size 
• Auditor identity 
• Level of non-audit services provided by the auditor 
• Corporate governance mechanisms 
The multiple regression analysis did not yield any meaningful statistically significant associations. 
However, there were significant correlations between HEPS manipulations and certain of the 
variables above. Further statistical testing was thus performed. This statistical testing indicated that 
large companies are more likely to engage in downwards HEPS manipulation and small companies 
are more likely to engage in upwards HEPS manipulation. Furthermore, there was also statistical 
evidence supporting the view that companies audited by a Big 4 audit firm engage in less HEPS 
manipulation than companies not audited by a Big 4 audit firm. 
In conclusion, there are JSE-listed companies in the sample of companies analysed that engage in 
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HEPS manipulation and these companies employ various techniques to do so. Company size and 
auditor identity appear to be factors influencing a company's propensity to engage in HEPS 
manipulation. 
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Chapter J: Introduction 
Chapter 1: introdu ction 
1.1 Sublect and Background 
"Every set of accounts is based on books which have been gently cooked or completely 
roasted. " 
Griffiths (1995; 1) 
The manipulation of reported accounting figures, known as creative accounting, has received 
considerable attention in global financial markets. The means used and motivations for 
creative accounting are numerous and varied and the existence of creative accounting has 
been documented by numerous researchers in different environments. 
A unique reporting requirement exists in South Africa for listed companies to report 
headline earnings per share. This figure is considered important by analysts and other users 
of financial performance as it excludes items of a capital nature and therefore provides an 
indication of a company's trading performance. 
It is submitted that the emphasis placed on the headline earnings figure by market 
participants motivates companies to manipulate this figure. The GAAP Monitoring Panel in 
South Africa has already identified instances of such manipulation. 
This study seeks to evaluate the extent to which listed South African companies engage in 
the manipulation of headline earnings. 
1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this research are to; 
• Determine whether or not companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange South 
Africa (JSE) engage in the manipulation of headline earnings per share (HEPS). 
• Identify the practices used by these companies to engage in HEPS manipulation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
• Compare the incidence ofHEPS manipulation among various industries. 
• Examine possible associations between the propensity of a company to engage in HEPS 
and specified factors. 
• Draw conclusions as to the prevalence of HEPS manipulation by JSE-listed companies 
and the factors associated with this prevalence. 
1.3 Scope and Limitations 
The examination ofHEPS was performed for a sample of the largest and smallest companies 
listed on the JSE as at 31 December 2004. However, this sample was considered to contain 
a sufficient variety of company characteristics to allow for a meaningful analysis. 
Furthermore, the HEPS manipulations analysed were limited to those which could be 
identified from the company's annual financial statements. 
1.4 Plan of Development 
This report is structured in 12 chapters, including this first introductory chapter. 
Chapters 2 and 3 contain a literature review on creative accounting and headline earnings 
respectively. These chapters examine prior research and findings as well as general 
literature in order to establish the background for this particular study. 
Chapter 4 presents and substantiates the research hypotheses for this study. Chapter 5 
details the research approach adopted to test these hypotheses. 
The empirical results are then presented and discussed in chapters 6 to 8. Findings relating 
to the overall HEPS manipulations detected and the techniques used for these manipulations 
are considered in Chapter 6. An analysis of the HEPS manipulations identified within 
specified industry classifications is presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 contains an overall 
examination of the association between HEPS manipulations and specified company 
characteristics. 
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Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter 10. Chapters 11 and 12 contain the references 
used in this report and the bibliography. 
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Chapter 2: A Review of the Creative Accounting Literature 
CHAPTER 2: a review of the creative accounting literature 
This chapter contains a review of the relevant literature on creative accounting. The literature 
review is necessary to understand the relevant research conducted in this area to date and to provide 
context for the hypotheses, design and conduct of the research documented in this report. The 
chapter begins by defining the term creative accounting and then proceeds to highlight the relevance 
of this topic by examining evidence of the existence of creative accounting. This is followed by an 
examination of the factors that motivate management to engage in creative accounting practices and 
additional factors that are associated with these practices. Finally, a discussion of the various 
creative accounting techniques employed in practice is presented. 
2.1 Creative Accounting Defined 
The term "creative accounting" is often used in two different contexts. Creative accounting 
is used to refer to the accounting practices developed by entities in accounting for new 
situations that are not yet dealt with in existing accounting standards. Alternatively, creative 
accounting is used to refer to various means of manipulating financial statements. The term 
"creative accounting", as used in this report, is used in the latter context. 
The literature contains various definitions of creative accounting. The following are two of 
the more comprehensive definitions: 
Jameson (1988: 20): 
"It is essentially a process of using the rules, the flexibility provided by them and the omissions 
within them, to make financial statements look somewhat different from what was intended by 
the rule. It consists of rule-bending and loophole-seeking.· 
Naser (1993: 59): 
"Creative accounting may be defined as (1) the process of manipulating accounting figures by 
taking advantage of the loopholes in accounting rules and the choices of measurement and 
disclosure practices in them to transform finanCial statements from what they should be, to what 
preparers would prefer to see reported and (2) the process by which transactions are structured 
so as to produce the required accounting results rather than reporting transactions in a neutral 
and consistent way.· 
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Chapter 2: A Review o/the Creative Accounting Literature 
Healy and Whalen (1999) emphasise that creative accounting transpires from the exercise of 
judgement by management in the structuring and financial reporting of transactions. 
Thus, creative accounting refers to the various practices management use to manipulate 
financial statements. The objective of creative accounting is to ensure that users of the 
financial statements draw the conclusions desired by management. This is achieved by 
structuring transactions or by exercising judgement in the preparation of financial statements 
to achieve the desired effect on the financial statements. 
Breton and Stolowy (2000) elaborate on the basic definition of creative accounting by 
classifying various forms of creative accounting practices, as illustrated i  Figure 1: 
Creative Accounting Practices 
/ / 
Earnings management Income smoothing Big bath accounting Window-dressing 
Objective Obtain a desired level Minimise variance in Reduce current Obtain desired 
of earnings earnings earnings in order to financial ratios (e.g. 
increase future debt to equity) 
earnings 
Figure 1: Classification of creative accounting practices 
2.2 Evidence of the Existence of Creative Accounting 
Healy and Whalen (1999) note that, despite the widespread belief that creative accounting 
exists, researchers have struggled to conclusively prove its existence. This struggle stems 
from the difficulty involved in estimating what the financial statements of a company would 
look like without the effect of creative accounting practices. However, a number of 
researchers, using a variety of methods, have been able to find evidence supporting the 
existence of creative accounting practices in a number of countries. 
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Chapter 2: A Review of the Creative Accounting Literature 
Selected evidence of creative accounting in various countries, including South Africa, is 
summarised in Table 1 on the folIowing page. This is folIowed by a detailed discussion of 
the relevant studies identified. 
Table 1,' Evidence of creative accounting practices in various countries 
Country Area of Creative Accounting Authors 
Australia Income smoothing Craig and Walsh (1989) 
Big bath accounting Godfrey, Mather and Ramsay 
(2003) 
Canada Change in accounting policy Saudagaran and Sepe (1996) 
Finland Earnings management Kasanen, Kinnunen and Niskanen 
(1996) 
Singapore Income smoothing Ashari, Koh, Tan and Wong 
(1994) 
South Africa Income smoothing Prinsloo, Ramsay-Slogrove and 
Rowlands (1996); Seelenbinder 
(1995); McQueen (2000) 
Spain General creative accounting Blake and Amat (1996) 
United Kingdom Foreign exchange Brayshaw and Eldin (1989) 
Misclassification of extraordinary Beattie, Brown, Ewers, John, 
and exceptional items Manson, Thomas and Turner 
(1994) 
United States of Change in accounting policy Pincus and Wasley (1994) 
America 
Income smoothing Copeland (1968) 
Big bath accounting Pourciau (1993) 
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Chapter 2: A Review o/the Creative Accounting Literature 
2.2.1 Australia 
Craig and Walsh (1989) selected a random sample of230 companies listed on the Sydney 
Stock Exchange and examined these companies' financial statements for the year ending in 
1985. The authors specified extraordinary item adjustments as the income smoothing 
technique to be studied. The authors identified 84 companies in the original sample that 
had reported extraordinary items in the relevant period. The authors then used statistical 
methods to analyse the trends in these companies' net profit figures and found strong 
substantive evidence of the use of extraordinary items to smooth net profit. 
Godfrey, Mather and Ramsay (2003) examined the financial reports of 63 Australian listed 
companies that changed chief executive officers (CEOs) during the period 1992 to 1998. 
The authors hypothesise that there will be downwards earnings management (i.e. big bath 
accounting) in the reporting period of the CEO change. The authors support this hypothesis 
with the argument that such a strategy establishes an initial low benchmark. This low 
benchmark increases the ability of the new CEO to subsequently manage earnings upwards, 
thereby increasing the perception ofhislher performance as CEO. The authors tested this 
hypothesis by examining the negative unexpected accruals reported by the sample 
companies in the reporting period of the CEO change and found some evidence of big bath 
accounting in this period. 
2.2.2 Canada 
Saudagaran and Sepe (1996) examined Canadian companies' use of accounting changes as 
an income smoothing technique. The authors selected a sample of 20 Canadian companies 
that reported voluntary accounting changes in the 1983 - 1986 period. Regression analysis 
was used to identify the factors that led these companies to make use of accounting changes. 
It was concluded that the companies employed this creative accounting technique in order to 
adjust the level of earnings and reduce earnings variability. 
2.2.3 Finland 
Kasanen, Kinnunen and Niskanen (1996) characterised the Finnish economic and regulatory 
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Chapter 2: A Review a/the Creative Accounting Literature 
environment as debt-denominated with a concentrated ownership structure. In this context, 
the authors hypothesised that Finnish companies manipulate earnings upwards in order to 
report a level of earnings high enough to payout a stable dividend to shareholders. The 
authors selected a sample of37 companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange and 
examined their financial statements over the period 1970 - 1989. The requirements of 
International Accounting Standards were used to recalculate these companies' reported 
earnings figures. This figure was used as a proxy for unmanaged earnings and compared to 
actual reported earnings to identify earnings management. The authors concluded that 
Finnish companies engage in earnings management motivated by dividend-based target 
earnings. 
2.2.4 Singapore 
Ashari, Koh, Tan and Wong (1994) selected a sample of 153 companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Singapore during the period 1980 to 1990. The authors used an income 
smoothing index formulated by Eckel (1981) and were able to identify evidence of income 
smoothing. 
2.2.5 South Africa 
Research on creative accounting by South African companies is fairly limited. Prinsloo, 
Ramsay-Slogrove and Rowlands (1996) investigated whether or not companies listed on the 
industrial sector of the JSE practise income smoothing. They distinguished between 
detectable and non-detectable artificial income smoothing (where artificial income 
smoothing refers to accounting manipulations) and real income smoothing (Le. transaction 
structuring) and investigated the use of each of these techniques. 
Prinsloo, Ramsay-Slogrove and Rowlands conducted a Delphi study to obtain experts' views 
on income smoothing in South Africa. The Delphi panel comprised external auditors, 
academics, financial statements users and ex-preparers of financial statements. The panel 
concluded that the managements of JSE companies, especially those listed in the industrial 
sector, are motivated to smooth income. 
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Chapter 2: A Review of the Creative Accounting Literature 
Prinsloo, Ramsay-Slogrove and Rowlands also performed a questionnaire-based experiment 
with financial directors of JSE industrial companies. They concluded that income 
smoothing is practised and that income smoothing is more likely to be present when 
companies exhibit low variability in reported earnings. They also concluded that all three 
forms ofincome smoothing (namely, detectable artificial techniques, non-detectable 
artificial techniques and real techniques) are widely used. 
Seelenbinder (1995) investigated income smoothing by 28 South African listed companies 
from 1988 to 1994. He specified the misclassification of extraordinary items (based on the 
old AC 103 definition of extraordinary items) as the smoothing variable. He found that 9 of 
the 28 companies examined (i.e. 32%) used extraordinary items to smooth income. 
McQueen (2000) examined South African banks over the period 1988 to 1999 and 
concluded that South African banks smooth income through the use of bad debts provisions. 
2.2.6 Spain 
Blake and Amat (1996) adopted a survey approach to establish the existence of creative 
accounting in Spain. A questionnaire was sent to partners in Spanish audit firms. 64% of 
the respondents viewed creative accounting as a serious problem in Spain, while 37% of the 
respondents indicated that creative accounting was becoming increasingly popular in Spain. 
2.2.7 United Kingdom 
Brayshaw and Eldin (1989) based their choice of an income smoothing technique to 
investigate on the accounting standards applicable to UK companies prior to 1983. These 
accounting standards permitted companies to report exchange differences either as part of 
ordinary income or as an extraordinary item. The authors selected a sample of 40 UK 
companies that reported exchange differences during the period 1975 - 1980. It was found 
that foreign exchange differences increased the volatility of these companies' reported 
income figures. Therefore, these companies classified these exchange differences as 
extraordinary items in order to smooth the volatility of ordinary income. 
18 
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Chapter 2: A Review a/the Creative Accounting Literature 
Beattie, Brown, Ewers, John, Manson, Thomas and Turner (1994) based their research on 
the assumption that the target of income smoothing practices is a company's reported profit 
after tax, but before extraordinary items. The income smoothing technique examined on this 
basis was therefore the classification of items as either above the line (Le. exceptional items) 
or below the line (i.e. extraordinary items). The authors selected a sample of over 200 UK 
companies that published financial statements in 1989 - 1990. Evidence was found that in 
the presence of volatile earnings, companies engage in the specified smoothing behaviour. 
Thus, the relevant literature provides considerable evidence that creative accounting is 
practised, both locally and internationally. 
2.2.8 United States of America 
Pincus and Wasley (1994) investigated the changes to accounting policies made by US 
companies over the period 1969 to 1988. The authors identified 6 920 accounting changes 
made by US companies over this period. These accounting changes were classified as either 
mandatory or voluntary and analysed further. Their research showed that, on average, 
voluntary accounting changes tend to be income-increasing. Furthermore, the authors found 
that companies are more likely to be early adopters of mandatory accounting changes if the 
change will increase the company's earnings. 
Copeland (1968) selected a sample of 19 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange. He 
identified two components of net income as variables containing income smoothing 
potential. Each firm in the sample was then classified as a smoother or non-smoother on the 
basis of these variables, over time periods of 2, 4, 6 and 8 years. Copeland identified a 
significant number of income smoothers within the sample of firms. 
Pourciau (1993) argues that when a company has had a change in CEO, the new CEO has a 
strong incentive to manage earnings downwards initially in order to manage expectations 
and set achievable performance goals. Pourciau examined the earnings, accruals, cash 
flows and special items and write-offs reported by a sample of73 US companies that had a 
change in CEO over the period 1985 to 1988. Pourciau identified certain difficulties and 
limitations of the research design, but nevertheless found weak evidence that these 
19 
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Chapter 2: A Review a/the Creative Accounting Literature 
companies engaged in big bath accounting in the initial reporting period following a CEO 
change. 
2.3 Incentives to Engage in Creative Accounting Practices 
Incentives are the reason for the existence of creative accounting. Without the existence of 
incentives, management would prepare financial statements with the objective of presenting 
users with a true and fair view of the entity. An examination of the incentives to engage in 
creative accounting practices is therefore crucial in understanding creative accounting. 
Duncan (2001) discusses the pressures to influence reported results from a practical 
perspective. He suggests that such pressures arise from one of three factors: factors outside 
of the firm (external factors), conditions or programmes within the firm (internal factors) or 
the motivational factors of individuals (personal factors). He then provides a comprehensive 
list of twenty such pressures, based on this classification. 
Table 2: Twenty pressures to influence reported results 
External Factors Internal Factors Personal Factors 
• Analysts' forecasts • Merger attractiveness • Personal bonuses 
• Access to debt markets • Management • Promotion 
compensation 
• Competition • Focus on team 
• Short-term focus 
• Contractual obligations • Job retention 
• Unrealistic plans and 
• Rising stock prices budgets • Desire to be seen as a 
hero or turnaround 
• New financial • Period-end requests specialist 
transactions from superiors 
• Low regard for auditors 
• Market disregard of big • Excessive profit 
charges followed by fear of 
decline 
• Concealing unlawful 
transactions 
Empirical research in this area has focused on three areas of incentives, namely contractual 
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Chapter 2: A Review a/the Creative Accounting Literature 
incentives, capital market incentives and regulatory incentives. Relevant research in these 
three areas is discussed below. 
2.3.1 Contractual Incentives 
Contractual incentives arise when an entity enters into a contract, the outcome of which is 
based on the accounting figures reported by the entity. The two main types of contracts 
relevant in this area are those relating to management compensation and debt covenant 
violation. 
• Management compensation 
Healy (1985) proposes that managers receiving bonus awards based on the firm's earnings 
will engage in earnings management to maximise their bonuses. Healy describes a bonus 
scheme whereby earnings below a certain level (the bogey) will result in no bonus. 
Thereafter the bonus amount increases as earnings increase, until a certain level of earnings 
(the cap) is reached, after which the bonus remains constant. He then argues that managers 
will manage earnings downwards when earnings are either below the bogey or above the 
cap, thereby increasing the probability of receiving a bonus in subsequent years. When 
earnings are between the bogey and the cap managers will manage earnings upwards so as to 
increase the bonus in the current year. Healy selected a sample of94 of the largest industrial 
corporations in the US in 1980 and used contingency tables to examine the relationship 
between discretionary accruals and accounting procedures and the characteristics of these 
companies' bonus plans. Healy found evidence of the use of accruals to manage earnings in 
the manner descri bed. 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) found evidence supporting Healy's argument. They 
investigated the use of bad debt provisions to manage earnings and found evidence of 
downwards earnings management when earnings are excessively high and when earnings are 
excessively low. Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999) found that US business unit managers 
manipulate earnings in the manner described by Healy. 
Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) found slightly contradictory evidence. Although, they 
found evidence of downwards earnings management when earnings are above the cap, they 
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found no evidence of downwards earnings management when earnings are below the bogey. 
However, it should be noted that their methodology differed from that used by Healy. 
The importance of the compensation incentive for engaging in creative accounting practices 
is emphasised by Shah's (1998) findings. He argues that one of the key motivators of 
creative accounting in the United Kingdom is the use of accounting numbers as performance 
indicators. 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between 
earnings management and the equity incentives, such as shares and share options, received 
by mangers. The motivation for earnings management is to increase share value in order to 
receive greater proceeds on the eventual sale of the shares earned through equity incentive 
schemes. The authors examined data relating to US firms over the period 1993 - 2000 and 
conclude that managers receiving high equity incentives are more likely to engage in 
earnings management in order to meet or just beat analysts' forecasts, compared to managers 
with low equity incentives. 
• Debt covenant violation 
Debt covenants are frequently based on accounting numbers and/or ratios derived from these 
numbers (e.g. interest coverage or debt equity ratios). It follows that entities nearing debt 
covenant violation will use creative accounting to prevent default. Alternatively, entities 
that have already violated such covenants may use creative accounting to aid future 
negotiations. 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) examined a sample of 94 US companies that had violated 
debt covenants from 1985 through to 1988. They hypothesised that these companies would 
have engaged in creative accounting practices in the year prior to the debt covenant 
violation. This hypothesis was tested by using time-series and cross-sectional models of 
normal accruals to identify abnormal accruals in the year preceding the debt covenant 
violations. The authors found significant positive accruals in the year prior to violation, 
leading to the conclusion that creative accounting is used in the year preceding the violation. 
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Sweeney (1994) conducted similar research by selecting a sample of 130 US firms that were 
first-time debt covenant violators in the period from 1980 to 1989. In addition, Sweeney 
also selected a sample of control firms within the same industry classifications as the 
violators. The firms' accounting choices were then investigated to identify the accounting 
responses of management to debt covenant violations. The study concludes that managers 
of firms approaching default engage in income-increasing accounting changes. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994) were unable to find evidence of such income-
increasing accounting changes in an examination ofthe accounting choices of76 firms listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange. However, sample selection was not based on debt 
covenant violations. Instead, the sample consisted of firms that had experienced a minimum 
of three annual losses in the period 1980 to 1985 and that had reduced cash dividends during 
this period. Firms reporting losses are less likely to have managed earnings upwards than 
firms reporting profits. The sample selection criterion of selecting firms experiencing losses 
was therefore biased towards selecting firms with low levels of unusual accruals. 
2.3.2 Capital Market Incentives 
Capital market incentives arise when managers believe that the company's market value is 
directly related to the figures reported in the financial statements. 
• Initial public offerings (IPOs) 
A company's set of financial statements is one of the most important inputs into the pricing 
of its initial public offering (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Krinsky and Rotenbery, 1989). 
Investors place more reliance on accounting-based information due to the absence of a 
market-determined price and a general lack of information about the company. 
Neill, Pourciau and Schaefer (I 995) found a significant positive correlation between the 
proceeds of an IPO and accounting methods that increase earnings and asset values. They 
concluded that issuers have incentives to engage in creative accounting in order to increase 
the initial offering price. 
Friedlan (1994) found evidence that IPO issuers manage earnings upwards in the financial 
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statements released prior to the offering. 
• Earnings forecasts and growth 
Another reason for engaging in creative accounting is to meet the expectations of financial 
analysts. Former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt (1998), in his speech, "The Numbers Game" 
blamed this incentive for the prevalence of earnings management in the US. 
Collingwood (2001: 65) refers to this incentive as the "earnings game", which he describes 
as follows: 
"The players of this game include analysts, investors, accounting firms, and companies 
themselves, all of whom have a great deal riding on the quarterly earnings number. Good 
earnings news can light a fire under a company's stock, but if the company misses its number by 
even a penny, its stock is likely to get hammered." 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examined the change in earnings reported by a sample of 
US companies over the period 1976 to 1994. An analysis of the cross-sectional distributions 
of earnings changes revealed low frequencies of small earnings decreases and high 
frequencies of small earnings increases, as well as low frequencies of small losses and high 
frequencies of small positive earnings. The findings of the study lead to the conclusion that 
companies manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses and to meet forecasts. 
Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley (2002) surveyed a sample of US auditors to determine their 
beliefs about managers' incentives for earnings management. The pressure to meet analysts' 
expectations emerged as the leading perceived incentive. 
2.3.3 Regulatory Incentives 
Regulatory incentives arise when reported accounting figures influence the actions of 
regulators or government officials and/or influence the impact of enacted regulations on the 
entity. 
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• Income tax 
When a company's income tax charge is based on its accounting earnings this may induce 
earnings management to minimise the company's income tax. 
Guenther (1994) found that firms use income-decreasing accruals in the year prior to a 
decrease in the statutory tax rate in order to defer the taxation of income to the following 
period, in which the tax rate is lower. Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1992) examined US 
firms during the 1986 - 1988 period, when statutory tax rates were decreased from 46% to 
34%. They found that firms deferred revenue recognition and/or accelerated expense 
recognition in the year prior to the tax rate reduction. 
• Industry regulation 
Healy and Wablen (1999) in their review of the earnings management literature suggest that 
industry-specific regulations create incentives for companies to use creative accounting to 
manipulate the accounting figures that receive regulators' attention. 
An example of such an industry-specific regulation is the capital adequacy requirements 
imposed by banking regulators. Moyer (1990) found evidence of creative accounting by 
banks nearing minimum capital adequacy requirements. 
• Official examination 
Following allegations of misconduct in a certain sector, companies in that sector may use 
creative accounting to portray a lower level of profitability in order to avoid official 
examination. This is done because excessively high profits may support allegations of 
misconduct (e.g. monopolistic behaviour or illegal actions) or over-emphasise a company's 
ability to pay damages. 
Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) found that managers of oil firms facing litigation with 
potentially large damage awards managed earnings downwards. 
2.4 Other Factors Associated with Creative Accounting 
In addition to the existence of incentives to engage in creative accounting techniques, there 
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are also factors that have been found to be indicative of an entity's propensity to engage in 
these techniques. This section examines a number of these factors. 
2.4.1 Company Size and Industry Classification 
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides (2000) investigated financial statement 
manipulations by US companies over the period 1987 to 1997. Their findings indicate that, 
on average, financial statement manipulators are relatively small (as measured by total 
assets). Beneish's (1999) examination of US earnings manipulators also found these 
companies to be smaller (in terms of total assets) than non-manipulators. Craig and Walsh 
(1989) arrived at the same conclusion in respect of Australian companies. 
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides also state that prior research points towards a 
concentration of financial statement manipulations within certain industries. The authors' 
findings support prior research as it was found that selected manipulation techniques are 
more prevalent in certain industry classifications. The authors categorised the various forms 
of financial statement manipulations and examined the use of these manipulation techniques 
within three industries: technology, health care and financial services. It was found that 
technology companies most commonly engaged in revenue recognition manipulation. 
Ashari, Koh, Tan and Wong (1994) found evidence of industry classification influencing the 
income smoothing engaged in by Singaporean companies. The authors found income 
smoothing to be more common amongst companies in the hotels and property sector and 
least common amongst companies in the industrial and commercial sector. 
2.4.2 The Role of Auditors 
Prior to the consolidation of audit firms and the fall of Arthur Andersen, the auditing 
profession was dominated by the "Big 6" firms (i.e. Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, 
Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse) (Krishnan, 
2003). Changes to the industry have resulted in the profession now being dominated by the 
"Big 4" firms (i.e. Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG and PriceWaterhouseCoopers). 
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Research conducted on the role of auditors and their possible association with the prevalence 
of earnings management indicates that clients of the "Big 4" audit firms are less likely to 
engage in earnings management for the following reasons (Krishnan, 2003): 
• These audit firms have the necessary resources and industry-specific expertise to detect 
earnings management practices. 
• There is more incentive for the "Big 4" audit firms to detect and report earnings 
management in order to protect their reputation. 
Dickins and Higgs (2005) state that an auditor's independence may be impaired by a high 
ratio of non-audit to audit services. This, in tum, may lead to an increased likelihood of 
compromise on financial reporting issues. A survey of US investors conducted by 
Hodge (2003) suggests that investors view a decrease in auditors' indepe dence as 
negatively impacting the reliability of financial information. 
Research conducted by Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) indicates that there is a positive 
correlation between the level of fees for non-audit services and the level of a company's 
discretionary accruals (used as a measure of earnings management). 
2.4.3 Financial Statement Indicators 
Beneish (1999) examined the financial statements of US companies that had been identified 
by the SEC or the news media as earnings manipulators. He then attempted to construct a 
model for predicting earnings manipulation on the basis of accounting data. 
Beneish's model predicts that earnings manipulators will have the following characteristics: 
• Large increases in the number of days' sales in accounts receivables; 
• Deterioration in gross margin; 
• Deterioration in asset quality (defined as the ratio of non-current assets, other than 
property, plant and equipment, to total assets); 
• High growth in sales; and 
• Large accounting accruals. 
Doumpos, Spathis and Zopounidis (2002) conducted a similar study on a sample of Greek 
firms to identify financial ratios that are possible indicators of falsified financial statements. 
Falsified financial statements were defined as those financial statements with qualified audit 
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reports. The authors identified a sample of 76 Greek firms. 38 ofthese firms had falsified 
financial statements and the remaining 38 had non-falsified financial statements. The 
authors then applied various financial ratios to the financial statements of the firms included 
in the sample and tested the significance ofthese financial ratios as identifiers of financial 
statement manipulations. The table on the following page contains the significant financial 
ratios identified by the authors, together with explanations supporting their significance. 
Table 3: Financial ratios used by Doumpos, Spathis and Zopounidis to identify falsified 
financial statements 
Financial Ratio Explanation 
Ratio of total debt to total assets A high debt structure increases the likelihood of 
fraudulent financial statements because additional risk 
is borne by debt owners (as opposed to managers and 
equity owners). 
Inventories to sales ratio Management may manipulate inventories by not 
matching sales to cost of goods sold or by failing to 
impair obsolete inventory. 
Net profit to sales ratio Managers may be motivated to manipulate net profit 
Sales to total assets ratio and/or sales in order to maintain or improve past levels 
of profitability. 
2.4.4 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Researchers have argued that weaker corporate governance mechanisms create opportunities 
for managers to engage in creative accounting as their actions are not closely monitored. 
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides (2000) compared the corporate governance 
mechanisms of financial statement manipulators and non-manipulators. A sample of 300 
US companies involved in alleged instances of fraudulent financial reporting was selected. 
Benchmark data on corporate governance mechanisms was then obtained from a sample of 
300 no-fraud companies. The authors found that financial statement manipulators, in 
comparison to non-manipulators, exhibit the following: 
28 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
Chapter 2: A Review of the Creative Accounting Literature 
• Fewer independent directors on the board of directors; 
• Audit committees that are less independent; and 
• Audit committees that meet less frequently. 
2.5 Forms of Creative Accounting 
Forms of creative accounting are numerous and varied. The creative accounting practices 
used by a particular entity will depend largely on the flexibility allowed by the accounting 
standards governing its financial reporting, as well as the specific objective(s) it is trying to 
achieve through the use of creative accounting. A detailed analysis of all possible creative 
accounting practices is thus impractical. Therefore, this section merely provides a broad 
overview of a select number of creative accounting practices. 
Schilit (1993: 2) refers to creative accounting practices as "financial shenanigans" and 
identifies the following seven "shenanigans": 
• Recording revenue too soon; 
• Recording bogus revenues; 
• Boosting income with one-time gains; 
• Shifting current expenses to a later period; 
• Failing to record or disclose all liabilities; 
• Shifting current income to a later period; and 
• Shifting future expenses to the current period. 
A broader perspective is provided in Table 4 on the following page, which details the 
various creative accounting practices discussed by a number of researchers. 
29 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
Chapter 2: A Review a/the Creative Accounting Literature 
Table 4: Creative accounting schemes 
Tweedie and Naser Smith 
Whittington (1993) (1996) 
(1990) 
Off-Balance Sheet Financing: 
• Leases ./ ./ ./ 
• Controlled non-subsidiaries ./ ./ ./ 
• Contingent contracts ./ 
Business Combinations: 
• Pooling method vs purchasing method ./ ./ 
• Fair value adjustments ./ ./ 
• Reorganisation expenses ./ 
• Treatment of goodwill subsequent to ./ 
recognition 
Equity accounting ./ 
Complex capital issues ./ ./ 
Contingent liabilities ./ 
Capitalisation of interest and other costs ./ 
Brands ./ ./ 
Pension contribution holiday ./ 
Irregular valuations ./ ./ 
Creating profit via asset disposal ./ ./ 
Misc1assification of extraordinary and ./ 
exceptional items 
Change in depreciation policy ./ 
Change in accounting policy ./ 
Table 4 illustrates that creative accounting practices include structuring transactions so as to 
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avoid inclusion on the balance sheet, hidden costs, classification issues and accounting 
policy manipulations. 
Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley (2002) surveyed a sample of US auditors to determine the most 
common forms of earnings management found in practice. The top three forms of earnings 
management were found to be in the areas of the manipulation of reserves, revenue 
recognition and business combinations. 
Harris (2002) suggests that the most predominant areas of creative accounting in South 
Africa include deferred expenses, contingent liabilities, intangible assets and foreign 
currency translations. 
The vast amount of research on creative accounting indicates that the manipulation of 
accounting figures takes place in many countries, including South Africa. However, it is 
acknowledged that the South African research in this area is limited. The means of creative 
accounting are diverse and researchers have found evidence of various motivators for 
engaging in creative accounting. The literature review justifies additional research into 
creative accounting practices in South Africa. The following chapter focuses on the literature 
relating to a specific area of potential South African creative accounting, namely: headline 
earnings. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Development of Headline Earnings 
This chapter serves as a basis for describing the concept of headline earnings (i.e. the specific area 
for potential creative accounting identified for research in this report). The chapter begins by 
describing the extent to which accounting information and, in particular, the earnings measure are 
considered useful by financial market participants. The chapter then proceeds to highlight the 
characteristics of a high quality earnings figure and how these characteristics lead to the 
development of the headline earnings concept. The development of the concept in the UK, South 
Africa and the US is then described. 
3.1 The Usefulness of Accounting Information 
The Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (1989: paragraph 12) states, 
"The objective of financial statements is to provide information about the financial position, 
performance and changes in financial position of an entity that is useful to a wide range of users 
in making economic decisions." 
Although, this may be the stated objective of financial statements, it is necessary to consider 
whether or not financial market participants consider this objective to be fulfilled. 
Various studies have examined the relevance of financial statements to various groups of 
market participants in various countries. Chang, Most and Brain (1983) surveyed a number 
of individual investors, institutional investors and financial analysts in the US, the UK and 
New Zealand. They reported that all three groups of investors in all three countries regard 
financial statements as useful in making investment decisions. 
Pike, Meerjanssen and Chadwick (1993) investigated the various information sources 
employed by investment analysts in Germany and Britain. Both groups of analysts viewed 
annual/interim reports as one of the top three sources of information. Gniewosz (1990) 
found the annual report to be one of the most important sources of information for 
Australian institutional investors. 
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In the South African context, Flynn (1987) reported that institutional investors regard 
company announcements and reports as the most important source of information in the 
decision-making process. Dewar's (2000) survey of South African sell-sidelbrokers' 
analysts found that this group of users regards financial statements as the second most 
valuable source of information in making investment decisions. 
Therefore, there is empirical evidence that accounting information is considered useful, both 
in South Africa and internationally. In practice, however, there is one aspect of accounting 
information that is focussed on, namely reported earnings. This is evidenced by coverage 
provided in the financial press, earnings forecasts prepared by investment analysts and the 
emphasis placed on this figure by companies themselves (e.g. in directors' reports). It is 
therefore necessary to specifically consider the relevance of a company's reported earnings 
figure. 
3.2 The Relevance of the Earnings Figure 
An entity's reported earnings figure is the net financial result of the firm's activities during 
the financial period, calculated in accordance with the applicable accounting standards. 
Nichols and Wahlen (2004: 263) define earnings as follows: 
• A firm's earnings number represents an accounting measure of the change in the value of the 
firm to common equity shareholders during a period (apart from the effects of direct transactions 
with shareholders, such as paying dividends or issuing shares)." 
A key indicator of the extent to which accounting information influences investors' 
decisions is the extent to which share prices move in response to the release of accounting 
information. An important figure in this context is a company's reported earnings figure. 
The seminal paper in this regard is Ball and Brown (1968). These authors successfully 
showed that abnormal security returns were experienced by companies whose reported 
earnings were higher or lower than that expected by the market. 
As discussed by Foster (1986), the Ball and Brown study opened a research area which has 
seen numerous subsequent event studies and research papers. Foster's discussion of the 
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research conducted into the association between accounting earnings and share price returns 
indicates that a strong association has been observed by many researchers and has been 
detected for companies listed in the US and outside of the US. 
It is therefore evident that market participants rely on the information embodied in a 
company's reported earnings figure. It is now necessary to consider why the earnings figure 
is considered relevant, together with the characteristics of the earnings figures that result in 
this relevance. 
3.3 The Quality of the Earnings Figure 
Beaver (1998) argues that the association between accounting earnings and share returns 
exists because of the following links: 
• A firm's current earnings figure is used as a basis for predicting future earnings. 
• Predicted future earnings are used to develop expectations of future dividend payments. 
• A firm's share value is the present value of expected future dividend payments. (This is 
the classical approach to equity valuation posited by finance theory.) 
Therefore, from an equity valuation perspective, it follows that the quality of the earnings 
figure may be defined as its usefulness in predicting a firm's future earning power. It should 
be noted that this is not the only perspective on equity valuations. For example, equity 
valuations are often also based on free cash flow models. However, irrespective of the 
validity of these alternative perspectives, they have not been discussed here as they are 
considered irrelevant to this study. 
Cornell and Landsman (2003: 23) argue that for an earnings measure to be useful in 
valuation exercises, the measure must effectively capture the "persistent component" of 
earnings. The authors argue that once-off accounting charges or write-offs create 
idiosyncratic variations in earnings that distort the predictive ability of this figure. 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) relate the quality of the earnings figure to its general decision 
usefulness. In this context, they consider various earnings quality constructs and measures, 
including persistence and predictability. The persistence construct is based on the premise 
34 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
:::::.,:= :: :::: : :: 
Chapter 3: The Development of Headline Earnings 
that high quality earnings are sustainable. The predictability construct contends that high 
quality earnings improve the ability of the users of financial statements to make relevant 
forecasts. 
The bottom-line earnings figure report by companies is all-encompassing and by its nature 
may not therefore satisfy the persistence and predictability criteria described above. It is this 
shortcoming of the bottom-line earnings figure that lead to the development of the concept 
of headline earnings. 
3.4 The Development of the Headline Earnings Concept in Various Countries 
The need to present an earnings figure that satisfies the decision-usefulness criterion lead to 
the development of variations on the basic earnings figure. These variations, as developed 
in three different countries (i.e. the United Kingdom, South Africa and the United States of 
America), are discussed below. 
3.4.1 United Kingdom 
The concept of headline earnings originated in the United Kingdom and was developed by 
the Institute of Investment Management and Research in the United Kingdom, IIMR (now 
the United Kingdom Society of Investment Professionals, UKSIP). 
IIMR issued Statement of Investment Practice No. J "The Definition of Headline Earnings" 
(SIP 1) in September 2003. IlMR recognised the impossibility of defining a single earnings 
figure that satisfies the requirements of all financial statement users. Instead, IlMR focussed 
on the assumption that most users employ the earnings figure for the following purposes (as 
stated in paragraph iv of the statement): 
"(a) A measure of the company's maintainable earning capacity, suitable in particular as a basis 
for forecasts and for inter-year comparisons, and for use on a per share basis in the calculation 
of the price/earnings ratio. 
(b) A factual 'headline' figure for historic earnings which can be a benchmark figure for the 
trading outcome for the year.' 
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Furthennore, IIMR also recognised that the calculation of a maintainable earnings figure 
requires the elimination of non-continuing items, which in tum requires a large amount of 
estimation and judgement. Paragraph vi of the statement accepts that, as a result, 
"the calculation of maintainable earnings figures cannot be put on a standardised basis." 
Despite this limitation, paragraph vii ofthe statement highlights the desirability and 
usefulness of an earnings figure with the following characteristics: 
"calculated on a standard basis, which can be used as an unambiguous reference point -
between users, the press, the statistical companies etc." 
SIP 1 defines headline earnings on the basis of these characteristics. The main features of 
this definition are as follows: 
• All trading profits and losses are included. 
• Profits and losses arising from discontinued operations or businesses acquired during the 
financial year are included. However, profits and losses attributable to disposal or 
tennination of discontinued operations are excluded. 
• Profits and losses on the disposal of fixed assets, as well as fixed asset impainnents, are 
excluded. 
On the basis of this definition, it is evident that headline earnings excludes items of a capital 
nature and, as such, serves as a measure of a company's trading perfonnance. 
3.4.2 South Africa 
The development of the headline earnings concept in South Africa was driven by the 
developments in the United Kingdom. Following the issuance of SIP 1 in the United 
Kingdom, the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) published an 
Accounting Issues Task Force Opinion, AC 306 "Headline Earnings - Effect of the issue of 
AC 103 (revised) on the calculation and disclosure of earnings per share." The 
requirements of this opinion mirrored the requirements of SIP 1 (Everingham and Watson, 
2001). 
A JSE listings requirement, effected on 30 August 2000, made it compulsory for all 
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companies listed on the JSE (the primary stock exchange in South Africa) to disclose a 
headline earnings per share figure calculated in terms of AC 306 (Everingham and Watson, 
2001). 
In December 2002, AC 306 was replaced by SAICA Circular 7/2002 Headline Earnings 
(Circular 7/2002). This document was developed by UKSIP in conjunction with various 
professional bodies in South Africa. The principles embodied in this circular are identical to 
SIP 1 (which is included as an appendix to the circular), but it provides more detailed 
guidance on the calculation of the headline earnings figure. This circular was effective from 
December 2002 and still governs the headline earnings calculations of JSE-Iisted companies. 
3.4.3 United States of America 
Over recent years, many American companies have included a pro-forma earnings figure in 
earnings releases (Cornell and Landsman, 2003). Pro-forma earnings figures are intended to 
provide a better indication of a company's true earning power by excluding items such as the 
amortisation of goodwill and other intangibles. However, pro-forma earnings figures are a 
non-GAAP earnings figure. As such, the calculation of this figure is not controlled and 
calculations vary between different companies. The pro-forma earnings figure is therefore 
not a transparent, comparable measure of a company's performance. 
In response to this problem, Standard and Poor's (2002: 5), a leading publisher of corporate 
financial data in the US, developed the concept of core earnings, defined as follows: 
·Core Earnings focus on a company's ongoing operations.· 
Standard and Poor's therefore developed a framework of specific items that should be 
included and excluded when calculating core earnings (as show in Table 5 on the following 
page). 
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Table 5: Items included in and excluded from Standard and Poor's core earnings 
Included in Core Earnings Excluded from Core Earnings 
• Employee stock option grant expense • Goodwill impairment charges 
• Restructuring charges from ongoing • Gains/losses from asset sales 
operations 
• Pension gains 
• Write-downs of depreciable or 
amortisable operating assets • Unrealised gains/losses from hedging 
activities 
• Pension costs 
• Merger/acquisition related expenses 
• Purchased research and development 
expenses • Litigation or insurance settlements and 
proceeds 
3.6 The Usefulness of the Headline Earnings Figure 
Lin and Walker (2000) investigated the usefulness of the headline earnings figure in 
explaining UK share prices. The authors constructed an accounting-based valuation model 
with basic earnings per share, headline earnings per share and book value per share as the 
independent variables. The model was applied to a sample of companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange in 1994. The results of the statistical analysis indicated that 
headline earnings per share was the most statistically significant explanatory variable in the 
model. This provides evidence of the usefulness of the headline earnings figure to financial 
market participants. 
It appears that research in this area is very limited. It was not possible to locate similar 
studies performed in South Africa or similar studies covering the core earnings figure 
reported in the US. 
It is therefore evident that the headline earnings concept was developed to address a specific 
need of users of financial statements. Furthermore, the widespread usage of this figure by 
the financial press indicates that this figure is considered useful by individuals and entities 
that use financial statements for various purposes. From the specific nature and usefulness 
of headline earnings it follows that this figure may be subject to manipulation to ensure that 
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users of the financial statements draw desired conclusions. This is developed into formal 
research hypotheses in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: hypotheses 
In order to achieve the objectives ofthis report, three hypotheses were fonnulated for testing based 
on the background infonnation obtained from the literature review contained in Chapters 2 and 3. 
These hypotheses are presented below: 
HI: Companies listed on the JSE manipulate their HEPS figure by deviating from the 
standard setters' requirements for the calculation of this figure. 
The literature review contained in Chapter 2 summarises evidence of creative accounting in 
various countries, including South Africa. The literature review provides evidence that 
companies may manipulate their earnings both upwards and downwards (Le. big bath 
accounting). 
All companies listed on the JSE are required to present an HEPS figure that has been 
calculated in accordance with the requirements of Circular 7/2002. This is required by 
paragraph 8.63(c) ofthe JSE Listings Requirements. 
The GAAP Monitoring Panel in South Africa is responsible for monitoring the compliance 
of JSE-listed companies' annual reports with Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practice, the Companies Act and JSE Listings Requirements. In a report on deficiencies 
over the period September 2002 to April 2005, the panel noted that there are companies that 
do not calculate headline earnings in accordance with the standard setters' requirements. 
Furthennore, analysts, the financial press and the companies themselves place emphasis on 
the reported HEPS figures. 
It is therefore hypothesised that HEPS is an additional area of potential creative accounting 
by South Africa companies, whereby these companies manage HEPS upwards or 
downwards to ensure that users ofthe financial statements draw certain conclusions desired 
by management. 
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Hz: The level of HEPS manipulation differs between companies in different industries. 
Companies within the same Jndustry exhibit similar characteristics and engage in similar 
activities. Therefore, it would be expected that the financial statements of these companies 
would contain similar items. Furthermore, it is assumed that companies in the same industry 
face similar pressures. It would therefore be expected that companies in different industries 
would engage in varying levels ofHEPS manipulation. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, research conducted by Ashari, Koh, Tan and Wong (1994) and 
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides (2000) supports the notion of an industry 
classification effect. 
H3: The extent to which a company manipulates its headline earnings is associated with 
seven factors: 
(i) Share price fluctuations 
(ii) Earnings growth 
(iii) Debt structure 
(iv)Company size 
(v) Auditor identity 
(vi)Level of non-audit services provided by the auditor 
(vii) Corporate governance mechanisms 
The above-mentioned factors have been extracted from the review of the creative accounting 
literature contained in Chapter 2. The rationale behind the inclusion of each factor is 
explained below. References to prior research confirming the explanatory power of each 
variable are also provided. 
• Share price fluctuations and earnings growth 
The desire to meet analysts' forecasts is a capital market incentive to engage in creative 
accounting (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Collingwood, 2001; Levitt, 1998; Nelson, Elliott 
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and Tarpley, 2002). This incentive may be intensified by a poor share price as greater 
earnings are required to improve investors' expectations. 
• Debt structure 
Debt covenant violation is a contractual incentive to engage in creative accounting (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). Furthermore, companies with excessive debt may 
manage earnings upwards to create the impression that they are capable of meeting debt 
obligations (Doumpos, Spathis and Zopounidis, 2002). 
It is acknowledged that various authors have debated the applicability of the debt structure 
argument in the absence of specific contractual information on an entity's actual debt 
covenants. Mohrman (1993) examined the debt covenant effect of an exposure draft issued 
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board for a sample of oil and gas firms in the US. 
Mohrman concludes that the leverage variable for the sample companies' does not 
encompass the contractual realities of the debt covenants and is therefore an inadequate 
proxy for use in analysing the link between debt structures and accounting policy choices. 
Smith (1993) argues that the association assumption underlying the debt hypothesis may be 
flawed. Companies for which a particular set of accounting techniques is efficient may also 
be those companies for which high leverage is efficient. Smith also argues that there are 
limitations to a cross-sectional analysis, which may be addressed by benchmarking a 
company's leverage against industry averages. 
Despite the limitations acknowledged above, it is still considered useful to include debt 
structure as a potential variable impacting the extent to which a company engages in 
headline earnings manipulation. However, caution will be exercised in the conclusions 
drawn on this variable. 
• Company size 
The financial statements of smaller companies are not as widely read and as closely 
scrutinized as those of larger companies. Therefore, it would be expected that smaller 
companies would engage in earnings management more frequently (Beasley, Carcello, 
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Hermanson and Lapides, 2000). 
An alternative view argues that high growth companies are more likely to engage in earnings 
management. Small companies have more growth prospects than larger companies and 
would thus be expected to engage in more earnings management (Beneish, 1999). 
• Auditor identity 
It is hypothesised that a company that is audited by one of the "Big 4" audit firms is less 
likely to engage in earnings management (Krishnan, 2003). The "Big 4" firms have the 
necessary resources and expertise to detect earnings management. These firms are also more 
motivated to prevent earnings management in order to protect their reputation. 
• Level of non-audit services provided by the auditor 
An auditor's independence may be impaired by the provision of non-audit services to an 
audit client. This could result in the auditor permitting earnings management practices 
(Dickins and Higgs, 2005; Frankel, Johnson and Nelson, 2002; Hodge, 2003). 
• Corporate governance mechanisms 
It is hypothesised that managers of companies with weak corporate governance mechanisms 
are more likely to engage in earnings management as their actions are not closely monitored 
(Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides, 2000). 
It is acknowledged that limitations exist in analysing the relationship between HEPS 
manipulation and the following factors: company size, auditor identity and corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
Demsetz (1993) considers the consequences ofthe separation of ownership and control of a 
company. Demsetz is of the view that a company's monitoring mechanisms (i.e. corporate 
governance structures and appointment of auditors) are determined by endogenous factors 
linked to the company's operating structure (including the company's size) and its financing 
arrangements. 
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Hennalin and Weisbach (2003) consider the research on companies' boards of directors. 
Hennalin and Weisbach review the factors that affect the makeup of a company's board of 
directors. However, the authors acknowledge the complexities of such an analysis as a 
result of endogeneity issues and are reluctant to reach concrete conclusions on causality. 
The statistical testing used for the purposes of this research does not address the endogeneity 
issues highlighted by the above-mentioned authors. However, the objective of the research 
is not to establish directional causal relationships, but rather to identify associations between 
HEPS manipulation and the previously mentioned factors. 
The following chapter addresses the approach developed to test the three specified 
hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH design and APPROACH 
This chapter provides detail on the design and application of the approach adopted in collecting and 
analysing the required data. The chapter begins with an overview of the research design, which is 
followed by a description of the sample design and the criteria used in the sample selection. This is 
followed by a discussion of the data collection design and the means used to gather the data 
necessary to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4. 
6.1 Research Design 
The research design for the purposes of this report took the form of a data study. This 
design was considered to be the most appropriate means of collecting relevant information 
for the purposes of analysis. The detail of this research design was then established in terms 
of sampling design and data collection design. These elements of the research design are 
addressed in sections 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. 
6.2 Sample Design and Selection 
The presentation of headline earnings is a 1SE Listings Requirement and is therefore only a 
compulsory reporting requirement for companies that are listed on the 1SE. The population 
for the purposes of this research therefore comprised all 1SE-listed companies. The initial 
sample was therefore selected from companies listed on the 1SE as at 31 December 2004, as 
reflected on a listing provided by the 1SE. 
One of the hypothesised factors influencing a company's propensity to engage in headline 
earnings manipulation is company size. To ensure that the sample covered a range of 
company sizes, the sampling process took a non-probability approach and the initial sample 
was specified based on company market capitalisation I as at 31 December 2004. The initial 
sample therefore consisted of the largest 100 and the smallest 100 1SE-listed companies, 
based on market capitalisation as at 31 December 2004. 
Each sample company's annual report for its financial year ending in the 2004 calendar year 
was obtained from the McGregor BFA Word Database. This initial phase of data collection 
I A company's market capitalisation is calculated as the product its number of shares in issue and its share price. 
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Chapter 5: Research Approach 
yielded an insufficient number of annual reports for companies with a small market 
capitalisation. This was attributable to a number of these companies not having annual 
reports available as a result of having been placed under liquidation or trading being 
suspended on these companies' shares. The sample was therefore extended to include the 
smallest 150 JSE-Iisted companies, based on market capitalisation as at 31 December 2004. 
Throughout the entire sample, companies were excluded for one of the following reasons: 
i) The company's annual report was not available on McGregor BFA Word Database; or 
ii) The company is dual-listed on a foreign stock exchange, does not prepare its financial 
statements in terms of South African Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practice ("SA GAAP") and did not present a headline earnings figure in its 2004 annual 
report; or 
iii) The company has more than one class of shares listed on the JSE and, as a result, appears 
twice in the sample of companies selected. In this scenario, the second appearance of the 
company in the sample has been excluded. 
Appendix I contains the names and market capitalisations of the extended sample of 
companies. The companies which were eliminated, for the reasons previously mentioned, 
have been highlighted. 
The final sample therefore consisted of 173 companies, comprising the following: 
• 89 of the largest 100 JSE-Iisted companies as at 31 December 2004 (hereafter referred to 
as large companies); and 
• 84 of the smallest 150 JSE-Iisted companies listed as at 31 December 2004 (hereafter 
referred to as small companies). 
5.3 Data Collection: Company Characteristics 
The variables used in the analysis of the factors mentioned in the second and third 
hypotheses, together with the information sources used to quantify these variables are 
discussed below. 
• Industry classification 
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The different industry classifications used to group the companies included in the sample 
were derived from the various sectors of the Main Board of the JSE. 
On this basis, the following 10 broad industry classifications were used: 
Basic industries 
Cyclical consumer goods 
Cyclical services 
Financials 
General industrials 
Information technology 
Non-cyclical consumer goods 
Non-cyclical services 
Real estate 
Resources 
The sample of companies selected included companies listed on the Alt X, Development 
Capital Market Board and Venture Capital Market Board2• These companies are not 
categorised into sectors and it was therefore necessary to classify them into the broad 
industries described above on the basis of the nature of the companies' operations. 
• Share price fluctuations 
The variable used to measure the fluctuation in a company's share price is the percentage 
movement in the company's closing share price between the beginning and end of the 
accounting period. Companies' annual reports are released subsequent to the end of the 
accounting period. It is therefore submitted that management would use the annual report to 
manage adverse share fluctuations during this period. 
The closing share prices were obtained from the JSE website (http://www.jse.co.za). 
• Earnings growth 
Earnings growth is measured as the percentage movement in a company's consolidated 
HEPS from the prior period to the current period (as disclosed in the annual report). Where 
2 These boards provide an alternative means for companies to list in terms ofless stringent listing requirements. 
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the current period is less than a year, this percentage is annualised. 
• Debt structure 
Debt structure is measured in terms of the ratio of total consolidated liabilities to equity (as 
shown in the group's balance sheet). During the financial period covered in this research, 
existing financial reporting standards considered outside shareholders to be neither debt nor 
equity. Instead, outside shareholders were required to be presented as a separate mezzanine 
category on the balance sheet. Therefore, the balance attributable to outside shareholders 
was excluded from both the debt and equity figures used to calculate the debt to equity ratio. 
• Company size 
Company size is measured in terms of market capitalisation (in Rands) as at 31 December 
2004, as reflected on a listing obtained from the JSE. 
• Auditor identity 
The identity of each company's auditor was identified from the audit report included in the 
annual report. In this respect the "Big 4" auditors are considered to be Deloitte, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
• Level of non-audit services provided by the auditor 
The Companies Act in South Africa requires a company to disclose in its financial 
statements the amount paid to the auditors, distinguishing between remuneration for the 
audit, for other specified services and for expenses. This required disclosure was used to 
calculate the ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees. Amounts paid for expenses are included in 
audit fees when calculating this ratio. 
• Corporate governance mechanisms 
The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa - 2002 (King Code) provides 
guidance on corporate governance for South African companies. The application section of 
this report specifically states that all companies listed on the JSE are required to comply with 
the code. 
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The requirements of the King Code were considered and the variables by which to measure 
the strength of a company's corporate governance mechanisms were identified on this basis. 
This is shown in the table on the following page. 
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Table 6: Corporate governance mechanisms 
Requirements of the King Code Variables used to measure compliance 
The board of directors should consist of a • Number of directors as a percentage of 
balance of executive and non-executive total directors that are non-executive.3 
directors, with a majority of non -executive 
directors. A sufficient number of non-
executive directors should be independent of 
management. 
The chairperson of the board of directors • Is the chairperson a non-executive 
should be an independent non-executive director? 3 
director. 
Each board of directors is required to have • Does the board of directors have an audit 
an audit committee. committee? 
• Number of meetings held by the audit 
committee during the accounting period. 
The JSE Listings Requirements require a company to disclose the extent to which the 
company has complied with the King Code, together with a narrative description of how the 
principles embodied in the King Code have been implemented. This disclosure, as provided 
in companies' annual reports, was used to measure the previously specified variables. 
It should be noted that the disclosures mentioned above are not provided within a company's 
financial statements, but rather elsewhere within the annual report. This information is 
therefore not audited. However, the disclosure is still considered reliable because of the 
requirements of South African auditing standards in respect of such information. The 
specific auditing standard that deals with such information, SAAS 720 Other information in 
documents containing audited statements, requires the auditor to review other information 
that is published with the audited financial statements to ensure that it is not inconsistent 
with the audited financial statements and does not contain a misstatement of fact. 
3 Although, the King code also specifies independence as a requirement, this has not been included in the variable as a 
result ofan insufficient number of companies in the sample disclosing information relating to the independence of their 
directors. 
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5.4 Sample Characteristics 
Industry representation within the selected sample of companies is shown in the table below. 
Table 7: Industry classification of sample companies 
Industry No. of companies Percentage 
Basic industries 15 9% 
Cyclical consumer goods 38 22% 
Cyclical services 5 3% 
Financials 40 23% 
General industrials 8 5% 
Information technology 14 8% 
Non-cyclical consumer goods 13 7% 
Non-cyclical services 9 5% 
Real estate 8 5% 
Resources 23 13% 
Total 173 100% 
The table below contrasts the characteristics of the some ofthe other variables previously 
defined for the large companies and small companies within the sample. 
Table 8: Overview of sample characteristics 
Variable Large companies Small companies 
Average growth in share price 42% 27% 
Average growth in HEPS 98% -124% 
Average debt: equity ratio 6.09 3.72 
Average market capitalisation R18.6 billion R29.2 million 
Percentage of companies audited by one ofthe 93% 38% 
"Big 4" audit firms 
Average ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees 0.30 0.36 
Percentage of companies with an audit committee 99% 71% 
Percentage of companies with a majority of non- 92% 48% 
executive directors on the board of directors 
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The previous table indicates an average decline in HEPS of 124% for small companies. 
Approximately 45% of the small companies included in the sample exhibited a decline in 
HEPS, with the average decline for these companies equaling 466%. It should be noted that 
this average is largely impacted by outliers, with the greatest decline amounting to 3 978%. 
The remaining 55% of the small companies exhibited an increase in HEPS, with the average 
increase equaling 159%. 
It should also be noted that the average absolute HEPS reported by small companies in 2003 
amounts to 24.56c, compared to an average of 377.89 for large companies. Furthermore, the 
companies included in the sample were selected on the basis of market capitalisation. On 
the basis of the equity valuation principles discussed in Chapter 3, companies with declining 
earnings are likely to have declining share prices. The selection criteria applied to selecting 
small companies is therefore biased towards selecting companies with declining earnings. 
Table 8 also indicates that the large companies in the sample have an average debt to equity 
ratio of 6.09, compared to a ratio of 3.72 for small companies. The large debt to equity ratio 
for large companies is attributable to the following: 
• The large debt to equity ratio of financial companies; and 
• An outlying debt to equity ratio of more than 200 for Growthpoint Properties Ltd (a 
property company with a large balance of debentures treated as debt). 
The average debt to equity ratio of all financial companies included in the sample amounts 
to 6.46 and arises as a result of the nature of the companies' operations. The Standard Bank 
Group, for example, had liabilities in excess ofR577 billion as at 31 December 2004, 
compared to equity of approximately R32 billion, resulting in a debt to equity ratio of 18. 
The sample of large companies includes 21 financial companies, which has a large upwards 
effect on the average debt to equity ratio for large companies. 
After excluding all financial companies and Growthpoint Properties Ltd from the sample of 
large companies the average debt to equity ratio for the remaining companies is 1.31. 
5.5 Data Collection: HEPS Manipulations 
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F or the purposes of this study, a HEPS manipulation is defined as a violation of the 
requirements of Circular 7/2002 in calculating HEPS that is detectable in the manners 
described in this section. Such a violation may occur under the following two 
circumstances: 
i) The company fails to adjust for items that are required to be excluded from headline 
earnings in terms of Circular 7/2002 (hereafter referred to as "unadjusted HEPS items"; 
and/or 
ii) The company adjusts for items that are not required to be excluded from headline 
earnings in terms of Circular 7/2002 (hereafter referred to as "invalid HEPS 
adjustments"). 
It should be noted that the data collection in respect of HEPS manipulations was performed 
on the consolidated figures presented by the companies in the sample. 
The manner in which these two forms ofHEPS manipulations were detected is discussed 
below. 
5.6.1 Required HEPS Adjustments 
The requirements of Circular 7/2002 were analysed to identify items that this circular 
requires to be excluded from headline earnings. These items have been defined separately 
for identification purposes and are detailed in the table on the following page, together with 
a reference to the rele ant paragraph in Circular 7/2002. 
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Table 9: HEPS adjustments required in terms o/Circular 712002 
No. Item to be excluded from headline earnings Circular 712002 
reference 
1. Profit or loss on the sale or discontinuance of discontinued Paragraph 21 
operations 
2. Profit or loss on the sale of property, plant and equipment Paragraph 22 
3. Profit or loss on the sale of intangible assets Paragraph 22 
4. Profit or loss on the sale of investment property Paragraph 22 
5. Profit or loss on the sale of an associate or a subsidiary Paragraph 22 
6. Impairment loss or the reversal of an impairment loss relating to Paragraph 22 
property, plant and equipment 
7. Impairment loss or the reversal of an impairment loss relating to Paragraph 22 
intangible assets 
8. Impairment loss or the reversal of an impairment loss relating to Paragraph 22 
investment property 
9. Fair value gain/loss recognised in relation to investment property Paragraph 22 
and included in the income statement in terms of the fair value 
model 
10. Fair value adjustments of available-for-sale financial instruments Paragraph 22A 
initially recognised in equity, but recycled through the income 
statement on disposal of these financial instruments 
11. Any amortisation charge, impairment loss or reversal of Paragraph 26 
impairment loss relating to goodwill 
12. The release of a foreign currency translation reserve to the Paragraph 22 
income statement as a result of a foreign entity being disposed 
13. Profits and losses arising from the reorganisation or redemption Paragraph 23 
of long term debt 
14. The recognition of the transitional liability relating to employee Paragraph 27 
benefits through the income statement, as permitted in terms of 
AC 116 Employee Benefits 
15. Impairment loss or the reversal of an impairment loss relating to Paragraph 22 
an associate 
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6.6.2 Identification of Required HEPS Adjustments 
It was possible to identify the presence of the above-mentioned items as a result of SA 
GAAP disclosure requirements, as described below in respect of each HEPS adjustment: 
• All HEPS adjustments 
AC 118 Cash Flow Statements requires a reconciliation of net profit before taxation per 
the income statement and cash generated from operations per the cash flow statement, 
disclosing adjustments for non-cash items. The nature of most of the required HEPS 
adjustment items would necessitate the separate disclosure of these items within this 
reconciliation. 
Paragraph 15 of AC 103 Net Profit or Loss/or the Period,. Fundamental Errors and 
Changes in Accounting Policies requires separate disclosure of the nature and amount of 
income and expense items included in operating profit that "are of such size, nature or 
incidence that their disclosure is relevant to explain the performance of the enterprise for 
the period". The nature of most of the required HEPS adjustment items results in 
companies providing this separate disclosure for such items. 
• HEPS adjustment no. 1 
AC 117 Discontinuing Operations requires separate disclosure of any gain or loss 
recognised on the disposal of assets or settlement of liabilities attributable to a 
discontinuing operation, as defined in the standard. 
• HEPS adjustment no. 6 
The disclosure requirements of AC 123 Property, Plant and Equipment CAC 123) 
include a reconciliation of the carrying amount of property, plant and equipment at the 
beginning and the end of the accounting period. This reconciliation is required to present 
impairment losses and the reversal of impairment losses recognised during the period 
separately. 
• HEPS adjustment no. 7 
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AC 129 Intangible Assets requires the disclosure of a reconciliation of the carrying 
amount of intangible assets at the beginning and the end of the accounting period. 
Impairment losses and the reversal of impairment losses recognised during the period are 
required to be presented separately within this reconciliation. 
• REPS adjustments no. 8 and no. 9 
AC 135 Investment Property permits an entity to apply either the cost model or the fair 
value model in measuring investment property. If an entity applies the cost model, it is 
required to present a reconciliation of the carrying amount of investment property at the 
beginning and end of the period, with impairment losses shown separately in this 
reconciliation. If an entity applies the fair value model, it is also required to present a 
reconciliation of the carrying amount of investment property at the beginning and end of 
the period, with fair value adjustments shown separately in this reconciliation. 
• REPS adjustment no. 10 
In respect of available-for-sale financial assets for which fair value adjustments are taken 
directly to equity, AC 133 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
requires separate disclosure of amounts removed from equity and reported in the income 
statement during the period. 
• REPS adjustment no. 11 
AC 131 Business Combinations requires the disclosure of a reconciliation of the carrying 
amount of goodwill at the beginning and end of the accounting period. Amortisation 
charges, impairment losses and the reversal of impairment losses are required to be 
shown separately within this reconciliation. 
• REPS adjustment no. 12 
AC 112 The Effects o/Changes in Foreign Exchange Differences requires a 
reconciliation of foreign exchange differences classified as a separate component of 
equity. 
• REPS adjustment no. 14 
57 
5 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
Chapter 5: Research Approach 
In terms of the disclosure requirements of AC 116 Employee Benefits, an entity is 
required to reconcile the net liability or asset in respect of defined benefit plans at the 
beginning and end of the period. 
6.6.3 Identification of Actual HEPS Adjustments 
AC 104 Earnings per Share (AC 104) is the South African accounting standard which 
addresses the disclosure requirements relating to earnings per share figures. In terms of this 
standard, where an entity discloses an earnings per share figure that is not required by 
AC 104, such as headline earnings, the entity is required to reconcile the numerator used to 
calculate this figure to a component of the income statement. 
Furthermore, paragraph 8.62(c) of the JSE Listings Requirements requires companies to 
present "an itemised reconciliation between headline earnings and the earnings used in the 
calculation of earnings per share". 
This reconciliation therefore provides details of all adjustments that have actually been made 
in arriving at the company's headline earnings figure. 
6.6.4 Unadjusted HEPS Items 
Each company's consolidated annual financial statements were analysed to identify items 
required to be adjusted for in the company's HEPS calculations. The identified items were 
then compared to the actual adjustments made, as reflected in the required reconciliation of 
headline earnings. In this way it was possible to identify and quantify items required to be 
adjusted for that had not been adjusted for in the calculation of the group's headline 
earnings. 
The following limitations on the identification and quantification of unadjusted items should 
be noted: 
• Circular 7/2002 requires adjustments to headline earnings to be made after taking into 
account the effects of outside shareholders and taxation. The disclosures through which 
required HEPS adjustments were identified do not provide this detail. Therefore, the 
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effects of outside shareholders and taxation were not taken into account. However, it is 
submitted that these effects would not have a significant impact since the income tax rate 
in South Africa is 30% and outside shareholders would probably not exceed a maximum 
of50%. 
• Circular 7/2002 also requires the previously mentioned HEPS adjustments to be made in 
respect of associates (i.e. where such amounts are included in equity accounted earnings 
from associates). Companies are not required to provide detailed disclosure in respect of 
associates that would allow for the identification of such items. Therefore, it was not 
possible to identify unadjusted HEPS adjustment items in respect of associates' earnings. 
5.5.5 Invalid HEPS Adjustments 
The reconciliation of headline earnings to basic earnings required in terms of AC 104 and 
the JSE Listings Requirements was further examined to identify items that had been adjusted 
for, but did not require adjustment in terms of Circular 7/2002. The itemised reconciliation 
allowed for the quantification and identification of the nature ofthese adjustments. 
5.6 Statistical Analyses 
Statistical analyses were used to achieve the objectives ofthis report as follows: 
• Descriptive statistics were produced for identified HEPS manipulations. 
• A one-sample t-test was used to conclude as to HEPS manipulations by the population of 
JSE-listed companies. 
• Descriptive statistics were produced to analyse the types ofHEPS manipulations. 
• An analysis of variance was employed to analyse differences in HEPS manipulations by 
ind!Jstry classification. 
• Multiple regression analysis was used to establish whether or not the hypothesised factors 
influence a company's propensity to engage in HEPS manipulations. 
• Two sample t-tests were used to further analyse the effect ofthe hypothesised factors. 
The findings from the application ofthis research approach to the identified sample are 
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detailed in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6: INCIDENCE AND TYPES OF HEPS manipulations 
Thi, charter addrc",,,.' the f()llowjn~ hypootilesis: 
II,: Compallie. listed on the JSE maniflUla~" tlwir HE~S figure hy dc,-iati ng from Ihe nandard 
sette",' requirement, for the c"lculation of lhi, r,gu,e, 
The chaplcr hogin' by dc-"cribin~ the overall ineid"]}c. 01'1 mrs m"nipulalioo, in Ihe '"mplc of )SE· 
li,[cd comranie_' selected for t.,ting, This is follmwd by a ,("lislie"1 analysi, or (he level of HEPS 
m"nipu lalit"" reported by the srullple companie" Lastly, [he variOlJs HEPS mmiru larion 
technique_, employed by 11", ,ample companies are examined. 
6.1 Overall HEPS Manipulations 
\Vi,hin II", ,ample of 173 companies_ 82 comranies (i.e. 47¥. of the sffillple) "'ere found to 
!k,YC mrulipulmcd their HEPS rL.!lure and arc classifioo as "HEPS manipulators", 
The HEPS mmlipulmon WeT. runher analysed IO determine if thc,e compani.5 had 
manipulated Ihdr HEPS fi~ur. upw,u-d, or downward" llw rie chari bolo,,' di"idcs the 
wlal samrle of companie, into downward, HEf'S manipulators, upwards TWP~ 
manipulator, and compmlie, t1wt did nm manipulale Iheir TIEPS fi~urcs (I.e, non-
manipulators j, 
"_nw_~ 
",,~C<' 
• ~"''' fIEPS 
"" "."..."". 
c """,'''' ...... ''''. 
Fig"'" 2. H U'S manljJUI~torJ and non-mallip,,/aio>" de/e,'led in the sample 
--~-.-~-
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I 
Ow]!",r 6: {/>cide"", ond J:>I''' of HI,}'S ,1/anil'"ialkJ1" 
A, irJioalcJ by Ihc "i;>ove fLgure_ 56 mmpanies (i_e_ 32% oflile sample) manipulated their 
HEPS figure ",,"'"rd' and 26 compani e, (i.e 15~/. of the ,ample) manipulated their I !EPS 
l;guTc duwnward,_ 
']1,e I i\ctaturc rc~ iew in Chapter 2 SllPJXltt, both coocept' of wmponie. manipulating 
eaming> up ward' "nd companies monipulating eamin~' downward" The motivators 
,upp<Jnin~ oo\h ~on"cpt' arc summarised in II", loble below 
Table 10: Moliva/or> fOl- upwards and downwal'ds HEi'S manipulation 
Motivators supporting uplVud, HEl>S 
maoipuJ.tion 
rvlaJlll!?;cmenl co~r<;at;on 
ManagGmCnl moy receive boouse, 
dCf'C"uant un the com pony achie,jng a 
spe"ifieu leve l of I-TJ ':PS Where tile IIEPS 
ji~urc i, bduw Ihi' level, management may 
munage 111:1'5 upward, in order to achieve 
the set mrget. 
m~nirula!ion 
Management compemation 
I Where the IIEPS jigure is above the target 
level required to ocilleve a bonu. , 
, management may manage IIEPS 
downward, in order to iocrea,e IIEPS in 
I future peri (x!>, Thi, i, in a"ouruaTl<'C with 
Ille lheury ll),pulhe,i,ed by Hcaly (1985)_ 
Furthermore, where lhere ha' becn a CH) 
"hunge, thcre may be big balh accounting 10 
improve the CI':O's performance (and 
"um f'en:;aliun) in ,ub""~l!Cn\ pcrioJ, 
I Deb! ovve nanl viulotiollS (Q"ffli,i,iia',;,iM,,'"'inaOill,i oi";-~-~-----l 
Monogcment may manage a company' Companie, in a 'f'i"oi{i" ""olur ma) mona~e 
, 11EPS jigure upward, in onJcr W ,,,,hicvc 1-11 ':PS downward, in order to avoid otlicial 
! HEl'5"rcbleJ ~o"uil ions impu,ed by the examillation ,purred by excessive pralil>, 
I ~umpon/s providers of debt or to create the 
I imprcssion that the company is capable of 
meetlllg its ob ligatiuns, 
-------- ------, 
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L 
by <flaly,I" T1"I11~);~munl mil) manag~ ~ 
company-, HErs figure upward,_ 
the figu,"" predicted hy analy<1<. 
manag .. nent may manage lIE~S 
downwards in order to ,void the prediction 
of unrealistically higb tumr. HEPS jjgure:;~ 
The refore, Ih. upw~Td, ~nd downwards llEPS manipulations detected in the sample of 
comp"ni • .I is in lim wilh the e'iSling lileralu," and ,,,earch on creative accounting. 
6.2 Statistical Analysis of HEPS Manipulations 
The following [()I"mula WJS us~d tu 'Juan!ify II cumpany's HErs manipulation' 
IIEPS Ul.nipulation ( "!oj 
[
c noojmled 1 !Fl';?)tem, I Imali,\l. lIEPS adj"S!"menl~ 
f{~po!1cd headline earning' J 
x 100 
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The table below repom ,ummary st~li.\1 ie:; of (he lIT' f'S m ""ipuiations for the entire ,ample 
of I 73 comp"nie, (i.u. incl uding thosc coml"'nics identified as 'lOll-manipulators). 
T"bI~ / I De.l'oriplive "lali'lio' of HEI'S manipulation. jor enlire sample 
-------
1\ um ber of companie, m 
-------
Rang~ -I ()()9,44'Yo to 3 063,59"/ , 
----_ .. _-
Mean 26_850/. 
Ab,olute me"" 41_320/. 
-----
. - . 
Median 0,00% 
.. 
Siandard dcviation 261.72% 
95'Y. confidcncu intc,,'~1 -12_15% to 65.85% 
. 
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Til<: modian HEPS manillUlatiotl for the sample is 0.1Xl!!,_ This i, cXIJeCted as the majority 
of wmpanio, (i.o. 53!!,) ,,·ore clo.'-'ifiod as IIOn-maniplLlators. The mean J-lEPS manipulation 
of26.85% support> \he ob,crvution thaI more companie, were identificd as upwards HEPS 
manipLlI"lor, lh"n downwards HEPS manipula\ors. The ab'olute mcan HEPS manipulation 
of 41.32!!o indte"leo:; lho "[,,;01 Ute a~e;age oxton( of upward' and down,,·ards T H-:PS 
manipl,I"lion "crO>' lho ,amplc_ '1"1>:0 ra"'dc of HEPS manipulations also indicates thaI the 
"[,,;olulc m"_,imllm upward' Hf-:PS manipulation (i_c_ 3 063.5</%) excced, the absolute 
ma_,imum downward, HEPS manipulation (Lc_ I 009,44%) 
Tile large range of HE1'S m"nipuialions. togethcr with the large ,t~ndard doviation arc 
indicative oftlle l"rge dispersion ofHE1'S m"nipublions dc(eclod in lhe ,ample. The 
di'T"'rsiotl of TlEPS manipulations is timher ill Llslra(e<! in the followin" ("blo and liguro. 
rahl~ / 2 RanK~ of rJF.PS mWlipu/a[illn\' 
--
R~nl:. No. orcomp~ni." 
-
Range 1 <-50% , 
R"n"e 2 , < -20!!o and _ -51)"/. , 
- --_.- I Range 3 , < .10'10 and,. -20% , I 
f{angc 4 <-5%and> -IO!!, , 
-- -
R"nge .I < _2!!, and" _5% , 
f{angc 6 <O%and> -2"/0 W 
Range 7 ,. 1)"/. arxl < 1% 
" 
Ran"e 8 ,. ~% and <- 5% 6 
f-iangc9 >5%atod< 10"/, 6 
Range 10 ,. 10''10 and =200/0 U 
-
Ran"e 11 ,. 20"/, aoo <~ 50"/. 6 
Ran"e 11 ,. 50!!. , 
---~ 
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rhc 9 outliers (hat manipulated their IIEpS by more than 50% warrant further examination. 
rhcse companie' wcre all from the sub-sample of ,ma ll companie,. The high percentage 
HEPS manipulation by the,e camp"" ie, results largely from the small HE f'S ligurC'! 
reported by tr",e com panies_ The averag_ HEPS reported by these " comp"nies was l5.44c. 
Therefore. HEPS m"nipul"tions ~h"~ were small On an absolutc basis became largc when 
<;(){l,idcred on " percentagc basis. For example_ Kin~ ConsolidJled I lold in~s Ltd reported 
HEPS of 0_3c. Maniplliations resulting in an over-statement of llEPS by 65c were identitied 
in rc.'pect of this company Although. thi' i, small on an ab,olute ba,i •• it C(){lvert, to 217% 
011 a percellmge basi,. 
Furthermore. it apl"''''' that upwards HEPS manipulators manipulate their I lEPS ligure to a 
greater extent th"n oowllwarJ.. HEPS m""ipu l"toIS_ rhe m"jorit)· of oowllward, H EPS 
manipulators (i.c_ 62~') manipulatcd their llEPS flgllre within the ran~c of 0% to -5%_ In 
contra't. 50"/. of upward' HErs manipulators manipulated their HEPS jigure by more than 
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Chapter 6: Incidence and Types of HEPS Manipulations 
10%. This incongruity between upwards and downwards HEPS manipulators is further 
analysed by producing separate descriptive statistics for HEPS manipulations overall, 
upwards HEPS manipulations and downwards HEPS manipulations. 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics of HEPS manipulations by manipulators 
No. of Range Mean Median Standard 
companies deviation 
HEPS manipulators 82 -1009.44% to 56.65% 2.48% 379.14% 
3063.59% 
Upwards HEPS 56 0.04% to 105.30% 9.68% 431.91% 
manipulators 3063.59% 
Downwards HEPS 26 -1 009.44% to -48.12% -3.43% 196.50% 
manipulators -0.06% 
As shown above, the absolute value of the median and mean upwards HEPS manipulations 
exceed the absolute value of the median and mean downwards HEPS manipulations. The 
standard deviation and range of upwards HEPS manipulations also exceed those of 
downwards HEPS manipulations. This provides further evidence of the greater dispersion 
and greater extent of upwards HEPS manipulations. 
6.2.2 Statistical Testing 
A one-sample t-test was performed to determine if the population mean HEPS manipulation 
differs significantly from zero. The hypothesis for testing and the alternative hypothesis are 
presented below: 
Ho: Il = 0 
HA: Il if:. 0 
Where: Il is the population mean HEPS manipulation. 
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Chapter 6: Incidence and Types of HEPS Manipulations 
The results of the t-test conducted in accordance with these hypotheses and the sample data 
collected yield a test statistic of 1.3495 and a p-value of 0.1772. This indicates that Ho is 
only rejected at a significance level of 17.72%. This high significance level results in a 
failure to reject Ho. The descriptive statistics provide evidence ofHEPS manipulation by the 
sample companies. However, the statistical testing in this regard is inconclusive. 
6.3 Types of HEPS Manipulations 
Two classes ofHEPS manipulations have been defined in Chapter 5, namely unadjusted 
HEPS items and invalid HEPS adjustments. The figure below illustrates the extent to which 
each class of manipulation was used by the HEPS manipulators identified in the sample. 
IIIlkladjusted I-EPS 
items 
• nvalid HEPS 
adjustments 
C lkladjusted items and 
invalid adjustments 
Figure 4: Classes of manipulation used by HEPS manipulators 
The largest percentage of manipulators (i.e. 41%) used invalid HEPS adjustments to 
manipulate their HEPS figures. This is closely followed by unadjusted HEPS items used by 
38% of manipulators to manipulate their HEPS figures. Only 21 % of manipulators used a 
combination of these techniques. 
67 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
Chapter 6: Incidence and Types of HEPS Manipulations 
6.3.1 Unadjusted HEPS Items 
The items that are required to be adjusted for in arriving at headline earnings (as specified in 
Circular 7/2002) have been listed and labelled in Table 9 contained in Chapter 5. 
The table below displays data relating to the incidence of these items being reported by 
companies and the extent to which companies contravened the requirements of Circular 
7/2002 to adjust for these items. 
Table 14: Unadjusted HEPS items identified in the sample 
HEPS No. of Companies failing to Direction of resulting 
adjustment companies adjust for item correctly HEPS manipulation 
reflecting item No. Percentage Upwards Downwards 
No.1 22 1 4.6% 100.0% 0.0% 
No.2 120 38 31.7% 71.1% 29.0% 
No.3 7 2 28.6% 0.0% 100.0% 
No.4 8 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
No.5 39 5 12.8% 100.0% 0.0% 
No.6 42 3 7.1% 33.3% 66.7% 
No.7 17 3 17.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
No.8 2 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
No.9 14 4 28.6% 75.0% 25.0% 
No. 10 15 2 13.3% 100.0% 0.0% 
No. 11 111 5 4.5% 20.0% 80.0% 
No. 12 7 3 42.9% 100.0% 0.0% 
No. 13 2 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
No. 14 4 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
No. 15 12 3 25.0% 66.7% 33.3% 
Total 422 69 16.4% 65.2% 34.8% 
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The 5 most commonly unadjusted HEPS items, as identified in the previous table are: 
• HEPS adjustment no. 12 (Le. the release of a foreign currency translation reserve to the 
income statement as a result of a foreign entity being disposed); 
• HEPS adjustment no. 2 (Le. profit or loss on the sale of property, plant and equipment); 
• HEPS adjustment no. 3 (Le. profit or loss on the sale of intangible assets); 
• HEPS adjustment no. 9 (Le. fair value gainlloss recognised in the income statement on 
investment property); and 
• HEPS adjustment no. 15 (Le. impairment loss or the reversal of an impairment loss 
relating to an associate). 
With the exception of item no. 3, in the majority of cases the effect of not adjusting for these 
items resulted in an upward manipulation ofHEPS. 
It is also noted that 38 of the 69 total unadjusted items are profit or loss on the sale of 
property, plant and equipment (Le. item no. 2). Super Group Ltd is an example of a 
company that manipulated its HEPS in this manner. It is evident from the group cash flow 
statement that a profit of R41.6 million on the sale of operating vehicles and equipment was 
realised in 2004. However, this is not adjusted for in the HEPS calculation, resulting in an 
11 % over-statement in the group's HEPS. 
120 companies reported a profit or loss on the sale of property, plant and equipment. The 
large number of instances of this item is a contributing factor to the large number of 
manipulations. However, it is of relevance to compare the manipulation of this item to item 
no. 11 (Le. any amortisation charge, impairment loss or reversal of impairment loss relating 
to goodwill). 111 companies reported item no. 11, but only 5 of these companies failed to 
adjust for this item correctly. Therefore, although both items are commonly reported, only 
item no. 2 is commonly manipulated. It is submitted that this discrepancy arises because 
failure to adjust for item no. 2 more commonly results in an upwards HEPS misstatement 
than failure to adjust for item no. 11. 
In contrast to the commonly non-adjusted items, the following items were adjusted for 
correctly by all companies reporting such items: 
• HEPS adjustment no. 4 (Le. profit or loss on the sale of investment property); 
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• HEPS adjustment no. 8 (Le. impairment loss or the reversal of an impairment loss 
relating to investment property); 
• HEPS adjustment no. 13 (Le. profits and losses arising from the reorganisation or 
redemption of long term debt); and 
• HEPS adjustment no. 14 (i.e. the recognition a transitional liability relating to employee 
benefits). 
6.3.2 Invalid HEPS Adjustments 
The invalid HEPS adjustment used to manipulate HEPS downwards are listed in the table 
below. This is followed by explanations of why these adjustments are invalid in terms of 
Circular 7/2002. 
Table J 5: Invalid HEPS adjustments used to manipulate HEPS downwards 
Description of downwards HEPS manipulation technique No. of companies 
using technique 
Reversal of impairment of financial instruments 5 
Profit on disposal of financial instruments 17 
Other: 2 
• Lease cancellation receipts 
• Recovery of onerous contract costs 
Paragraph 22A of Circular 7/2002 specifically states the following: 
"Adjustments to the carrying amounts of financial instruments (whether the result of revaluation, 
impairment or amortisation) and gains on losses on the realisation thereof should be dealt with in 
accordance with the accounting treatment in the financial statements. If an adjustment or gain or 
loss is included in the income statement, it should be included in Headline Earnings, but 
otherwise excluded." 
The only exclusion from the paragraph mentioned above is amounts relating to available-for-
sale financial instruments previously recognised in equity. 
Therefore, adjustments made in respect of the reversal of impairment losses on financial 
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instruments and profits on the disposal of financial instruments are in contravention of the 
specific requirement of Circular 7/2002 to include such items in headline earnings. 
The other adjustments used to manipulate HEPS downwards are not specifically addressed 
by Circular 7/2002. However, they do not satisfy the general requirement of Circular 7/2002 
to only adjust for capital items since these items are not capital in nature. 
The invalid HEPS adjustment used to manipulate HEPS upwards are listed in the table on 
the following page, followed by explanations of why these are invalid in terms of 
Circular 7/2002. 
Table 16: Invalid HEPS adjustments used to manipulate HEPS upwards 
Description of upwards HEPS manipulation technique No. of companies 
using technique 
Impairment of financial instruments 11 
Loss on disposal of financial instruments 7 
Amortisation of intangible assets (other than goodwill) 13 
Loss on discontinued operations 2 
Provisions 2 
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Other: 9 
• Estate closure costs 
• Subsidiary's prior year losses 
• Listing expenses 
• Research and development costs 
• Retrenchment costs 
• Exchange losses 
• Arbitration settlement 
• Legal expenses 
• Expenditure on aborted projects 
As previously mentioned, the adjustments relating to financial instruments are in 
contravention of the specific requirement of paragraph 22A of Circular 7/2002 to include 
such items in headline earnings. 
The other items which are specifically addressed by Circular 7/2002 are as follows: 
• Paragraph 26A specifically requires the amortisation of intangible assets to be included 
in headline earnings. 
• Paragraph 21 states that profits and losses arising from discontinued operations should be 
included in headline earnings. 
• The income statement effect of recognising provisions is required to be included in 
headline earnings in terms of paragraph 25 of the circular. 
The remaining items contained in Table 16 are not addressed by the circular specifically, but 
do not satisfy the general criterion of being of a capital nature. 
It is interesting to note the number of companies that adjusted incorrectly for the 
amortisation of intangible assets other than goodwill. Despite the specific requirement of 
Circular 7/2002 to not adjust for this item, it appears that these companies are attempting to 
treat all intangible assets (i.e. goodwill as well as other intangible assets) in the same manner 
for HEPS purposes. An example of such a company is Command Holdings Ltd. This 
company adjusted its headline earnings for the amortisation of trademarks amounting to 
R213 000, resulting in a 5% over-statement of HEPS. This adjustment to headline earnings 
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is even described as "Amortisation of goodwill" in the headline earnings reconciliation to 
mask this manipulation. 
With respect to invalid HEPS adjustments used to manipulate HEPS both upwards and 
downwards, the most common manipulation technique relates to financial instruments. It 
appears that companies consider these items to be capital in nature and adjust headline 
earnings accordingly, similarly to amounts arising from the impairment and disposal of 
property, plant and equipment. This is despite the specific requirement of Circular 7/2002 to 
not adjust headline earnings for these items. 
A number of companies calculated their HEPS by adjusting basic earnings for all items that 
had been classified as "exceptional". In the majority of cases, companies that are not 
financial in nature classify amounts relating to financial instruments as "exceptional". The 
proposition that amounts relating to financial instruments are adjusted for as a result of being 
considered capital in nature is substantiated by this observation. 
An example of a company that followed this practice is Mvelaphanda Group Ltd. An 
impairment loss on a loan account ofR238 000 recognised in 2004 was classified as an 
exceptional item in the 2004 financial statements and headline earnings adjusted 
accordingly. 
In summary, this chapter contains the findings of the testing of HI. These findings provide 
evidence of both upwards and downwards HEPS manipulation by companies in the sample. 
Although, the statistical evidence to extend this finding to the population of JSE-listed 
companies is inconclusive. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the sample companies 
used various means to achieve HEPS manipUlation. The existence of HEPS manipulation 
by the sample companies warrants further consideration of whether there is industry 
concentration of HEPS manipulation and the characteristics of HEPS manipulators. The 
following two chapters address this by describing the findings of the testing of H2 and H3• 
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CHAPTER 7: INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION OF HEPS manipulations 
This chapter addresses the hypothesis shown below. 
Hz: The level ofHEPS manipulation differs between companies in different industries. 
The chapter begins by analysing the incidence of HEPS manipulations detected within the various 
defined industry classifications. This is followed by a statistical analysis of the levels ofHEPS 
manipulations identified within these industry classifications. 
7.1 Incidence of HEPS Manipulations within Industry Classifications 
The companies included in the sample were examined within the 10 broad industry 
classifications defined in Chapter S. The results of this analysis are described in the table 
below. 
Table 17: Incidence of HEPS manipulation by industry 
Industry HEPS manipulators Non-
Upwards Downwards Total manipulators 
Basic industries 33.3% 20.0% S3.3% 46.7% 
Cyclical consumer goods 31.6% IS.8% 47.4% S2.6% 
Cyclical services 20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 80.0% 
Financials 32.5% IS.0% 47.S% S2.S% 
General industrials SO.O% 12.5% 62.S% 37.5% 
Information technology SO.O% 0.0% SO.O% SO.O% 
Non-cyclical consumer 61.5% 7.7% 69.2% 30.8% 
goods 
Non-cyclical services 11.1% 44.4% SS.5% 44.5% 
Real estate 12.5% 2S.0% 37.S% 62.5% 
Resources 17.4% 13.0% 30.4% 69.6% 
The industries with more than half of the companies classified as HEPS manipulators are 
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Chapter 7: Industry Concentration of HEPS Manipulations 
basic industries, general industrials, non-cyclical consumer goods and non-cyclical services. 
With the exception of non-cyclical services, the majority of HEPS manipulators within these 
industry classifications manipulated their HEPS figures upwards. 
The industries with the smallest percentage of manipulators are cyclical services, resources 
and real estate. 
7.2 Statistical Analysis of HEPS Manipulations within Industry Classifications 
Descriptive statistics and detailed statistical testing relating to HEPS manipulation per 
industry classification are presented separately below. 
7.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Summary statistics of the HEPS manipulations identified for all companies within each 
industry classification are presented in the table below. 
Table 18: Summary statistics of HEPS manipulation by industry 
Industry No. of Mean Absolute Median Standard 
companies mean deviation 
Basic industries 15 1.2% 4.2% 0.0% 6.9% 
Cyclical consumer 38 6.8% 11.1% 0.0% 37.0% 
goods 
Cyclical services 5 6.8% 6.8% 0.0% 15.2% 
Financials 40 58.8% 111.7% 0.0% 514.0% 
General industrials 8 50.1% 50.5% 3.4% 127.9% 
Infonnation 14 4.8% 4.8% 0.5% 9.6% 
technology 
Non-cyclical 13 2.8% 2.9% 0.4% 4.4% 
consumer goods 
Non-cyclical services 9 40.7% 41.8% 0.0% 123.9% 
Real estate 8 -2.4% 8.0% 0.0% 17.6% 
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Resources 23 49.3% 0.0% 221.3% 
The only industry exhibiting a mean downwards HEPS manipulation is real estate. The 
remaining industries all exhibit a mean upwards HEPS manipulation. 
The largest mean HEPS manipulation on an absolute basis is exhibited by financials. 
However, this industry also has the largest standard deviation of HEPS manipulations, which 
is indicative of a large dispersion of manipulations by companies in this industry. As shown 
in Table 17,47.5% of the companies within this industry classification were found to be 
HEPS manipulators. 
The financial companies that manipulated their HEPS upwards to the greatest extent include 
Proper Group Ltd, Zeltis Holdings Ltd and Aquila Growth Ltd. These companies are all 
from the sub-sample of small companies. Proper Group Ltd and Zeltis Holdings Ltd both 
achieved these manipulations by invalidly adjusting for items relating to financial 
instruments. In contrast, Aquila Growth Ltd achieved this manipulation by invalidly 
adjusting for a foreign exchange loss recognised in the income statement. 
The second largest mean HEPS manipulation on a non-absolute basis is exhibited by general 
industrials. On an absolute basis, this industry exhibits the third largest mean HEPS 
manipulation. This industry was also identified as having more HEPS manipulators than 
non-manipulators (as shown in Table 17) and exhibits the highest median HEPS 
manipulation. 
The general industrials companies that manipulated their HEPS upwards to the greatest 
extent include Monteagle Holdings Societe Anonyme, Zaptronix Ltd and Imperial Holdings 
Ltd. The first 2 companies mentioned are from the sub-sample of small companies and the 
last company mentioned in from the sub-sample of large companies. Both Monteagle 
Holdings Societe Anonyme, Zaptronix Ltd achieved their HEPS manipulations by invalidly 
adjusting for items relating to financial instruments. In contrast, Imperial Holdings Ltd 
achieved its HEPS manipulation by failing to adjust for the impairment and profit on 
disposal of items of property, plant and equipment. This was substantiated by failing to 
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classify leasing assets, transport vehicles and vehicles for hire as items of property, plant and 
equipment and, as a result, not adjusting for items relating to these assets. It is submitted 
that the assets are misclassified in accordance with the requirements of AC 123 and this has 
therefore been classified as an HEPS manipulation. 
High mean HEPS manipulations are also exhibited by non-cyclical services and resources, 
with resources exhibiting the second largest mean HEPS manipulation on an absolute basis. 
However, both industries also exhibit high standard deviations and median HEPS 
manipulations of zero. This indicates that the high mean is influenced by the existence of 
outliers. 
Low mean HEPS manipulations are exhibited by basic industries, cyclical consumer goods, 
cyclical consumer services, non-cyclical consumer goods and information technology. 
These industries also exhibit relatively low standard deviations in comparison to the other 
industries presented. 
The summary statistics provided above, together with the incidence ofHEPS manipulation 
presented in the previous section, point towards a high incidence of HEPS manipulation in 
the general industrials industry classification, as well as a high mean and median HEPS 
manipulation by companies within this industry. 
7.2.2 Statistical Testing 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine whether differences exist among 
the population mean HEPS manipulation per industry classification. 
The hypothesis for testing and the alternative hypothesis are as follows: 
Ho: /-lB = /-lee = /-les = /-IF = /-lG = /-ll = /-lNee = /-lNes = /-lRE = /-lR 
HA: At least 2 means differ 
Where: /-lB is the population mean HEPS manipulation for basic industries; 
/-lee is the population mean HEPS manipulation for cyclical consumer goods; 
/-les is the population mean HEPS manipulation for cyclical consumer services; 
/JF is the population mean HEPS manipulation for financials; 
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f.l.G is the population mean HEPS manipulation for general industrials; 
f.l.l is the population mean HEPS manipulation for information technology; 
f.l.NCC is the population mean HEPS manipulation for non-cyclical consumer goods; 
J.lNCS is the population mean HEPS manipulation for non-cyclical consumer 
services; 
f.l.RE is the population mean HEPS manipulation for real estate; and 
f.l.R is the population mean HEPS manipulation for resources. 
The results of the ANOYA test are shown in the table below. 
Table 19: ANOVA test of HEPS manipulation between industries 
Source of variation SS df MS F-statistic 
Between groups 10.6813 9 1.1868 0.1657 
Within groups 1 167.4963 163 7.1626 
Total 1 178.1776 172 
p-va)ue 
0.9970 
The high p-value results in a failure to reject the null hypothesis. The statistical testing 
provides very little evidence ofHEPS manipulation differing between industries. However, 
it should be noted that this is largely as a result of the large variances of HEPS 
manipulations contained within each industry, as reflected by the large sum of squares and 
mean squares within groups. 
In summary, this chapter indicates that HEPS manipulation takes place to a varying degree 
in the specified industry classifications. Specific conclusions in this regard are drawn in 
Chapter 9. The following chapter continues with the detail of the findings of the application 
of the research approach by considering H3• 
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CHAPTER 8: HEPS MANIPULATIONS & COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS 
This chapter addresses the following hypothesis: 
IL: The extent to which a company manipulates its headline earnings is associated with seven 
specified factors. 
This analysis begins with an overall examination of all hypothesised factors influencing a 
company's propensity to engage in HEPS manipulation. This is followed by a detailed statistical 
analysis of individual factors. 
8.1 Association between HEPS Manipulations and Company Characteristics 
A multiple regression model was used to test the hypothesis that the extent to which a 
company engages in HEPS manipulation is determined by specified characteristics of the 
company. 
The multiple regression model used in its general form is as follows: 
= (1. + ~i1CAPi + ~i2SPi + ~i3HEPSi + ~i4DEBTi + ~isAUDi + 
Where: 
HEPS_Mi = Percentage HEPS manipulation by company 
CAP; 
SP; 
= 
= 
Company's market capitalisation (in Rands) as at 31 December 2004 
Percentage movement in company's closing share price between 
previous and current balance sheet date 
HEPS; = 
DEBT; = 
AVD; = 
NON_AUD; = 
ACOM; = 
Percentage movement in reported HEPS for prior and current year 
Company's debt equity ratio 
1 if the company's auditor is one of the Big 4 audit firms and 0 
otherwise 
Ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees 
1 if the company has an Audit Committee and 0 otherwise 
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ACOM_M 
CHMNi 
NON_EXECi 
l3il - 10 
EJ 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Number of meetings held by the Audit Committee during the 
financial year 
1 if the company's chairman is a non-executive director and 0 if the 
company's chairman is an executive director 
Percentage of directors that are non-executive 
Coefficients of variables from 1 to 10 
Residual term 
Table 20 on the following page contains the correlation results on the different variables in 
the regression model. 
The percentage HEPS manipulation (HEPS _ M) was tested for significant correlation with 
the independent variables in the model. At the 5% level, HEPS_M is significantly 
negatively correlated with the following independent variables: 
• AVO; 
• ACOM;and 
• ACOM_M. 
This indicates the impact of the identity ofa company's auditor and the strength of the 
company's corporate governance mechanisms on the propensity of a company to engage in 
HEPS manipulations. 
As expected, HEPS_M is negatively correlated with CAP, SP and CHMN and positively 
correlated with HEPS and DEBT. The correlations with NON_AVO and NON_EXEC are 
not in the expected directions. However, these correlations are not statistically significant. 
It is also interesting to note the positive correlations between CAP and the variables AUD, 
ACOM, CHMN and NON_EXEC. Statistical testing indicates that these positive 
correlations are significant at levels of less than 2%. This indicates that larger companies 
are more likely to be audited by one of the Big 4 firms and appear to have stronger corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
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Table 20: CorreIa/ion results on regression variables 
HEPS_M CAP SP HEPS DEBT AUD NON_AUD ACOM ACOM_M CHMN NON_EXEC 
HEPS_M 1.000 
CAP -0.047 1.000 
SP -0.055 0.051 1.000 
HEPS 0.018 0.098 0.177 1.000 
DEBT 0.006 -0.001 -0.054 0.010 1.000 
AUD -0.140 0.293 0,078 0.220 0.019 1.000 
NON_AUD -0.039 0.132 0.065 0.041 -0.018 -0.008 1.000 
ACOM -0.172 0.175 0.041 0.167 0.040 0.405 0.056 1.000 
ACOM_M -0.144 0.378 0.096 0.271 -0.009 0.505 0.052 0.476 1.000 
CHMN -0.073 0.177 0.136 0.044 0.092 0.262 0.003 0.329 0.344 1.000 
NON_EXEC 0.074 0.231 0.019 0.157 0.085 0.245 0.136 0.267 0.311 0.492 1.000 
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The results of the multiple regression analysis are shown in the table below. 
Table 21: Results o/multiple regression analysis 
Sample size = 173 
Multiple R = 0.266 R2 =0.071 Adjusted R2 = 0.013 
F-statistic = 1.232 p-value = 0.274 Std error of estimate: 2.600 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 0.599 0.790 0.431 
CAP 0.000 0.058 0.954 
SP -0.152 -0.474 0.636 
HEPS 0.031 0.783 0.435 
DEBT 0.000 -0.007 0.995 
AVD -0.466 -0.921 0.358 
NON_AVO -0.164 -0.691 0.490 
ACOM -0.978 -1.461 0.146 
ACOM_M -0.114 -0.852 0.395 
CHMN -0.430 -0.742 0.459 
NON_EXEC 2.438 2.054 0.042 
The R 2 figure indicates that only 7.1 % of the variability in HEPS _Mis explained by the 
variables included in the regression model. The adjusted R2 figure, which controls for the 
number of independent variables included in the analysis, is even lower at 1.3%. The p-
value associated with the F-statistic is 0.274. This indicates that, although the model does 
offer some explanatory power, this is not considered significant. 
An examination of the individual regression coefficients reveals that only NON_EXEC 
significant at the 5% level. However, as previously noted, the direction of the relationship 
ofHEPS_M with this variable is opposite to the direction expected. 
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As a result of the incondu,iven." of the mUltiple regre"ion model, it wa, decided to 
petioml the tollowing additional separate ,tatistical analys." 
• The HErs manipulations oflarge com~ani es weTe compared to tho,e ohman 
compame" 
• The sample wa, di\iid.d irno those companies whose auditors are one of tho Big 4 tinm 
and tho", companies whose auditors are l>Ut one of the Big 4 finm. Tho HErs 
manipnlations by th."e two groups of comp""ie, we,e analy,ed. 
• The sample was divided into companie, with good corporate governance meehani' m, 
and companies that with weak corjXlrate governance mechani,ms. The J-JEPS 
manipulation< by these two groups of comp,mies we,e analysed. 
rllese anal)'ses rna)' be fonnd in the fo llowing sections. 
8.2 Analysis of Company Size Effect 
Tho incidence of upward, HErs manipulmiOtl. downward, HEPS manipnlation and non-
manipulation was identifi ed separately for ,mall companies and large companies. The", are 
contra'ted in the fo llowing figure. 
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As jIlustmted, in comparison to ,mal l ~ompanies, a great", percentage of large ~ompanies 
manipulmed their HErs jigure, downwards or did notmaniruiale their HEPS at alL In 
~omrarison 10 large companie •. a greater percentage of smali com pan ie, manipulated thei' 
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A two-sample t-test was then used to test the difference in population mean HEPS 
manipulation for large and small companies. The hypothesis for testing and the alternative 
hypothesis are as follows: 
Ho: fl.L = fl.s 
HA: fl.L < fl.s 
Where: fl.L is the population mean HEPS manipulation for large companies; and 
fl.s is the population mean HEPS manipulation for small companies. 
Table 22: Two-sample t-test of mean HEPS manipulation by large and small companies 
Large companies Small companies 
Mean -10.87% 66.82% 
Absolute mean 14.19% 70.03% 
Standard deviation 107.28% 355.81% 
Observations 89 84 
Degrees of freedom 97 
t-statistic -1.9203 
p-value 0.0289 
As a result of the downwards HEPS manipulators identified in the sub-category of large 
companies, the mean HEPS manipulation by large companies is negative. Similarly, the 
large number of upwards HEPS manipulators identified in the sub-category of small 
companies results in a positive mean HEPS manipulation by small companies. The absolute 
mean HEPS manipulation indicates that the magnitude ofHEPS manipulation by small 
companies is greater than the magnitude ofHEPS manipulation by large companies. While 
both sub-categories exhibit large variations in the level of HEPS manipulation, greater 
variation is exhibited by small companies. 
The p-value generated by the t-test indicates that Ho is rejected at a significance level of 
2.89%. This therefore indicates that there is significant evidence that the population mean 
HEPS manipulation for large companies is smaller than the population mean HEPS 
manipulation for small companies. 
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8.3 Analysis of Auditor Effect 
The total sample of companies included 115 companies (i.e. 66%) audited by one of the Big 
4 firms. 50 of these companies (i.e. 43%) were identified as HEPS manipulators. Within 
the sub-category of 58 companies not audited by one of the Big 4 firms, 32 companies (i.e. 
55%) were identified as HEPS manipulators. 
It has been hypothesised that the identity of a company's auditor may deter the company 
from engaging in overall earnings management (as discussed in Chapter 4). Auditor identity 
would therefore be considered to affect upwards and downwards HEPS manipulation to the 
same extent. It is therefore considered most useful to consider the absolute value of the 
HEPS manipulations engaged in by these sub-categories of companies. 
A two-sample t-test was used to test the difference in population mean absolute HEPS 
manipulation for companies audited by one of the Big 4 firms and companies not audited by 
one of the Big 4 firms. The hypothesis for testing and the alternative hypothesis are as 
follows: 
Ho: PB = PN 
HA : PB< PN 
Where: PB is the population mean of the absolute HEPS manipUlation by companies audited 
by one of the Big 4 firms; and 
PN is the population mean of the absolute HEPS manipulation by companies that are 
not audited by one of the Big 4 firms. 
Table 23: Two-sample t-test of absolute mean HEPS manipulation. based on auditor effect 
Companies audited by one Companies not audited by 
ofthe Big 4 firms one ofthe Big 4 firms 
Absolute mean 4.36% 114.60% 
Standard deviation 10.65% 441.88% 
Observations 115 58 
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Degrees of freedom 57 
t-statistic -1.8998 
p-value 0.0313 
The mean reflected 10 the table above for companies that do not have Big 4 auditors IS 
considerably greater than the mean reflected for companies that do have Big 4 auditors. 
The p-value generated by the t-test indicates that Ho is rejected at a significance level of 
3.13%. This therefore indicates that there is significant statistical evidence of a greater 
extent ofHEPS manipulation by companies that are not audited by one of the Big 4 firms. 
The greater standard deviation reflected for companies that are not audited by a Big 4 firms 
also indicates a greater variability in the HEPS manipulations identified for these companies. 
8.4 Analysis of the Effect of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The sample of companies was subdivided into "companies with strong corporate governance 
mechanisms" and "companies with weak corporate governance mechanisms". Companies 
were classified as having strong corporate governance mechanisms if all of the following 
criteria were satisfied: 
• The company has an Audit Committee; 
• The company's chairman is a non-executive director; and 
• The company's board of directors consists of a majority of non-executive directors. 
If any of these criteria were not satisfied then the company was classified as having weak 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
On this basis, 102 companies were classified as having strong corporate governance 
mechanisms. 47% of these companies were classified as HEPS manipulators. 49% of the 
71 companies that were classified as having weak corporate governance mechanisms were 
classified as HEPS manipulators. 
It has been hypothesised that weak corporate governance will result in a company being 
more likely to engage in earnings management (as discussed in Chapter 4). The strength of a 
company's corporate governance mechanisms would therefore be expected to impact 
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upwards and downwards HEPS manipulation to the same extent. It is therefore considered 
most useful to consider the absolute value ofthe HEPS manipulations engaged in by these 
sub-categories of companies. 
A two-sample t-test was used to test the difference in population mean absolute HEPS 
manipulation by companies with strong and weak. corporate governance mechanisms. The 
hypothesis for testing and the alternative hypothesis are as follows: 
Ho: p,s = p,w 
HA: p,s< p,w 
Where: p,s is the population mean of the absolute HEPS manipulation by companies with 
strong corporate governance mechanisms; and 
p,w is the population mean of the absolute HEPS manipulation by companies with 
weak. corporate governance mechanisms. 
Table 24: Two-sample t-test of absolute HEPS manipulation, based on corporate 
governance mechanisms 
Companies with strong Companies with weak 
corporate governance corporate governance 
mechanisms mechanisms 
Absolute mean 17.75% 75.18% 
Standard deviation 110.45% 382.49% 
Observations 102 71 
Degrees of freedom 78 
t-statistic -1.2300 
p-value 0.1112 
The p-value generated by the t-test indicates that Ho is rejected only at a significance level of 
11.12%. This results in a failure to reject Ho. Although, there does appear to be a 
relationship between HEPS manipulations and the strength of corporate governance 
mechanisms, the statistical testing in this regard is inconclusive. 
In summary, the multiple regression analysis used to consider the association between HEPS 
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manipulation and specified company characteristics is detailed in this chapter and found to 
be statistically inconclusive. On this basis, further testing was conducted on the association 
between HEPS manipulation and company size, auditor identity and corporate governance 
mechanisms. The conclusions in this regard, as well as the conclusions on the testing of HI 
and H2, are described in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of the testing of the hypotheses specified in Chapter 4, using the research approach 
specified in Chapter 5, are detailed in the three preceding chapters. Based on these findings, 
conclusions are drawn in the following areas: 
9.1 Incidence of HEPS Manipulations by JSE-listed companies 
Within the sample of 173 companies, 82 companies (i.e. 47%) were identified as HEPS 
manipulators. The descriptive statistics provide evidence that there are JSE-Iisted 
companies within the sample that engage in HEPS manipulation. However, the statistical 
testing to extend this conclusion to the population of JSE-Iisted companies is inconclusive. 
The findings also provide evidence of both upwards and downwards HEPS manipulation. 
However, the incidence of upwards HEPS manipulation is more prominent and the 
magnitude of upwards HEPS manipulation is greater than the magnitude of downwards 
HEPS manipulation. 
9.2 Types of HEPS Manipulations 
Companies engage in HEPS manipulations by failing to adjust for items that are required to 
be adjusted for in terms of Circular 7/2002 and/or by making adjustments that are contrary to 
the requirements of the circular. The findings suggest that none of the techniques are clearly 
predominant and that both are used to the same extent. 
The most frequently unadjusted items are the release of a foreign currency translation 
reserve to the income statement upon the disposal of a foreign entity and the profit or loss on 
the disposal of property, plant and equipment. The items in respect of which companies are 
most likely to make invalid adjustment are financial instruments and the amortisation of 
intangible assets. 
9.3 Differences in HEPS Manipulation by Industry 
The percentage ofHEPS manipulators identified per industry classification varied across the 
89 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
::::::::::: : ::::::[q] 
Chapter 9: Conclusions 
various industry classifications. This appears to indicate that there are differences in HEPS 
manipulation by industry. The general industrials industry classification appears to exhibit 
the greatest extent and magnitude ofHEPS manipulation. 
However, the statistical evidence relating to industry differences is inconclusive as a result 
of the large variation ofHEPS manipulation within each industry classification. 
9.4 Factors Associated with the Propensity of a Company to Engage in HEPS 
Manipulation 
The multiple regression analysis conducted revealed no meaningful significant associations 
between HEPS manipulations and specified company characteristics. 
However, separate statistical testing revealed significant associations between HEPS 
manipulations and the following company characteristics: 
• Company size; and 
• Auditor identity. 
Large companies are more likely to engage in downwards HEPS manipulation and small 
companies are more likely to engage in upwards HEPS manipulation. This is possibly 
associated with capital market incentives for earnings management. Large companies are 
most likely to have moved out of their high growth stage and would therefore manipulate 
HEPS downwards in order to prevent unrealistically high future earnings forecasts. Small 
companies, in contrast, are most likely to be entering their high growth stage and would 
therefore manipulate HEPS upwards in order to emphasis future growth capacity. 
It is also possible to conclude that companies audited by one of the Big 4 firms are less 
likely to engage in HEPS manipulation. 
Furthermore, descriptive statistics indicate a relationship between the strength of a 
company's corporate governance mechanisms and HEPS manipulation. However, it is noted 
that the statistical testing in this regard is inconclusive. 
It should be noted that there are strong positive correlations between company size, auditor 
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identity and the strength of a company's corporate governance mechanisms. This is 
expected as a result of the endogeneity issues already identified in Chapter 4. Large 
companies are more likely to be audited by one of the Big 4 firms and are more likely to 
have strong corporate governance mechanisms than small companies. Therefore, it is not 
possible to conclude if all three factors influence HEPS manipUlation to a similar extent or if 
there is one leading influential factor. 
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CHAPTER 10: SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Considering the findings and conclusions of this report, further research in this area could be 
conducted in the following ways: 
• The research could be extended by performing a time-series analysis of HEPS manipulations 
over a period to establish manipulation patterns. 
• Similar research could be conducted on HEPS figures reported by UK companies to compare 
HEPS manipulations internationally. 
• Users of companies' financial statements (e.g. investment analysts) could be surveyed to 
establish how useful and reliable they consider reported HEPS figures. 
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Table 25: Largest 100 companies listed on the JSE as at 31 December 2004 
Equity Name Market 
Capitalisation as at 
31/12/2004 
Anglo American PIc R 199373508019 
BHP BiIliton Plc# R 162 897 702 132 
Richemont Securities DR# R 98136000000 
SAB Miller PIc R 95 875 522 495 
Standard Bank Group Ltd R 88 968 730 548 
Sasol Ltd R 81 546428425 
Firstrand Ltd R 73 108938523 
MTN Group Ltd R 72 291 401 202 
Old Mutual Plc# R 55 084 404 818 
Telkom SA Ltd R 54 589 118262 
Anglogold Ashanti Ltd R 52 630 760 534 
ABSA Group Ltd R 49777635073 
Remgro Ltd R 45905540814 
Anglo American Platinum Ltd R 45002937672 
Sanlam Ltd R 35978418671 
Gold Fields Ltd R 34 193 508843 
Liberty International PIc R 33 937 587 939 
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd R 31957627894 
Nedcor Ltd R 30 667 368 936 
Ispat Iscor Ltd R 29 196764646 
RMB Holdings Ltd R 25846714483 
Bidvest Ltd R 25518679284 
Barloworld Ltd R 23 696 729 250 
Naspers Ltd R 23591 152500 
Imperial Holdings Ltd R 22 829 130 584 
Harmony G M Co Ltd R 20 224 049 561 
Sappi Ltd R 19842967036 
Liberty Group Ltd R 18421 087606 
Edgars Consol Stores Ltd R 16476202431 
Tiger Brands Ltd R 16353 199623 
Pretoria Portland Cement Ltd R 15 321953 115 
Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd R 14297 163741 
Lonmin Plc# R 14020343469 
Investec PIc R 13 538 561 524 
Kumba Resources Ltd R 13 281 585284 
JD Group Ltd R 11 729 400 000 
Pick 'n Pay Stores Ltd R 11 278 306 062 
Venfin Ltd R 11 244 640 564 
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